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Abstract 
This is the third article in a four-article series that exam-
ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical 
problem of whether free will is compatible with “deter-
minism,” the doctrine of universal causation. The first ar-
ticle (“Earlier”) focused on the first publications on this 
issue in the 1970s, the “early period.” The second (“Paleo-
compatibilism”) and the present articles examine key re-
sponses published in the last part of the Twentieth and 
the first part of the Twenty-first centuries, the “middle 
period.” The fourth article (“Recent”) examines responses 
published in the last few years, the “recent period.” 
Whereas early-period scholars endorsed a compatibilism 
between free will and determinism, in the middle period 
the pendulum moved the other way: Mark Siderits argued 
for a two tiered compatibilism/incompatibilism (or semi-
                                                             
1 Department of History, Philosophy and Political Science, Kingsborough College, CUNY. 
Email: rrepetti@kingsborough.edu. 
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compatibilism) that he dubs “paleo-compatibilism,” 
grounded in the early Buddhist reductionist notion of 
“two truths”: conventional truth and ultimate truth; and 
Charles Goodman argued that Buddhists accept hard de-
terminism—the view that because determinism is true, 
there can be no free will—because in the absence of a real 
self determinism leaves no room for morally responsible 
agency. In “Paleo-compatibilism,” I focused on Siderits’s 
reductionist account. The present article focuses on 
Goodman’s hard determinism, and the fourth article will 
examine the most recent publications expressing Bud-
dhist views of free will. Together with my own meditation 
based Buddhist account of free will (“Meditation”), this 
series of articles provides a comprehensive review of the 
leading extant writings on this subject. 
 
Buddhist Scholarship on Free Will: An Introduction2 
Buddhist scholarship on the question of the compatibility of free will and 
determinism is a relatively new phenomenon. Throughout the bulk of 
Buddhist history, apart from a few fragments of early Buddhism in which 
the Buddha explicitly rejects a then prevalent form of fatalism (Feder-
man “Buddha”), there has been almost no explicit discussion of the issue. 
Only recently, encounters with Western philosophy and science raise the 
question of what Buddhism, in light of its rich philosophies of mind and 
action, has to offer to this—perhaps the most enduring—question in the 
Western philosophical tradition.  
                                                             
2 I would like to thank Dan Cozort, Charles Goodman, Claire Gaynor, Suzanne O’Neill, 
Eva Kokoris, and two anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Buddhist Ethics for com-
ments to this article. 
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 Let me first review the free will and determinism dilemma, and 
then how various Buddhist scholars have weighed in on the issue. De-
terminism implies that every event is causally necessitated by previous 
events in inviolable accordance with immutable laws of nature. Belief in 
free will implies that some of our deliberative efforts, choices, and ac-
tions are sufficiently self-authored or “up to us,” such that they ground 
attributions of moral responsibility, such as praise and blame, related 
reactive attitudes, such as remorse and punishment, and the variety of 
our normative institutions that presuppose that much of our behavior 
flows from our autonomous agency. The dilemma here is that either de-
terminism is true or false. If determinism is true, then the causes of our 
actions predate our existence and are unalterable, in which case our be-
havior, though it appears to be our free choice, is really rigidly fixed in 
advance, in which case we are not morally responsible. However, if de-
terminism is false, the causes of our choices are utterly random and cha-
otic, and thus they are no more “up to us” than a seizure or the toss of a 
coin. Either way, we seem to lack free will and ultimate moral responsi-
bility. 
 I divide the extant Buddhist scholarship on this issue into three 
chronological periods—early, middle, and recent—but the writings from 
each also exhibit certain conceptual affinities. Let me first review the 
results of my own analyses of the writings of each period, as reflected in 
my earlier articles,3 in order to frame the arguments of the present arti-
cle. 
 
                                                             
3 See Repetti (“Earlier”; “Paleo-compatibilism”). The review in the text ought to provide 
a sufficient framework for readers who prefer not to read those articles prior to read-
ing this one.  
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Early-period scholarship 
In the early period, there was a flurry of initial scholarship on the issue. 
In the first article in this series (“Earlier”), I examined the writings of 
most major early-period Buddhist scholars—Frances Story, Walpola 
Rāhula, Luis Gómez, and David Kalupahana—regarding the free will and 
determinism/indeterminism dilemma. Determinism, it should be noted, 
resembles the Buddhist causal doctrine of “dependent origination” 
(pratītya samutpāda). Dependent origination theory asserts the depend-
ence of all conditioned/composite phenomena on previous (and/or sim-
ultaneous) impartite microphenomena.  
 Most scholars of this period attempted to show that Buddhism 
was not vulnerable to the dilemma that consists of the prima facie incom-
patibility between determinism (or its Buddhist cousin, dependent origi-
nation) and free will. Early-period scholars attempted to circumvent this 
dilemma by arguing for some sort of middle path position that avoids 
both “rigid” determinism and “chaotic” indeterminism, but their at-
tempts insufficiently articulated just what sort of causation could occupy 
this middle ground.  
 As I noted in “Paleo-compatibilism,” some such Buddhists (in-
cluding one from the middle period, Siderits) hold that David Hume’s 
deflationary error theory of causation, wherein causation is no more 
than a conceptual construction and projection based on the perceived 
constant conjunction of contingent event types, precisely provides the 
middle path Buddhists would need for a Buddhist compatibilism between 
free will and both determinism and indeterminism. However promising 
this appears at first, on analysis it is insufficient for the task at hand, be-
cause determinism presupposes necessary causal relations, not contin-
gent ones; therefore, determinism is not Humean. Buddhists are certain-
ly entitled to embrace the Humean error theory about causation, as 
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some do, but if dependent origination is Humean, then the Buddhist re-
ply to the free will problem is simply to claim that determinism is false.  
 The Humean middle path option comes at too great a cost for 
Buddhists for two reasons. First, because it undermines the idea that de-
pendent origination is genuinely causal, rather than a conceptual con-
struction about event pairings that is best explained by an error theory, 
all of the explanatory work that causality does in the rest of Buddhism 
would be deflated. Second, it impales Buddhists on the other horn of the 
dilemma, chaotic indeterminism. 
 Early-period scholars failed to notice another middle path option, 
one that is sufficiently articulated and fairly transparent in meaning 
among Western philosophers, namely, soft determinism. Soft determin-
ism is the idea that determined behavior need not be rigid and need not 
be incompatible with a certain nonchaotic conception of free will and 
moral responsibility, because one may satisfy certain determinism 
friendly agent proximal conditions that might be sufficient for responsi-
ble agency. For example, to mention just two such agent proximal condi-
tions, the knowledge of cause and effect renders undesirable events evi-
table (and thus nonrigid), and mindfulness of the way volition generates 
action helps to cultivate control over one’s volitions—and control is 
nonchaotic.  
 Buddhists first encountering the dilemma of free will and deter-
minism/indeterminism tend to automatically regard all determinism as 
though it is hard determinism, but as the preceding line of thought 
makes clear, not all interpretations of determinism require such a (hard) 
reading. Hard determinism is the idea that determinism is true and, be-
cause of its nomological implication of an unalterable series of events, it 
is incompatible with responsible agency (mainly because its ultimate 
causes are distal and preagential); therefore, it precludes moral respon-
sibility or free will. Obviously, soft and hard determinists agree that de-
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terminism is true. Fatalism and hard determinism share the idea that 
nothing anyone does can make any difference to what—already—will be, 
but the former is an acausal doctrine, whereas the latter is causal.4 The 
Buddha rejected the fatalistic attitude of agential impotence, precisely 
on the ground that it would lead to what may be described as a form of 
volitional catatonia (Harvey “Buddhist”; Federman “Buddha”). Instead, 
the Buddha emphasized the knowledge of cause and effect and the culti-
vation of mindfulness of beliefs, volitions, and actions as his basic pre-
scription for what an agent may do to foster her own liberation and 
bring about the end of her suffering. Thus, if dependent origination is 
deterministic, the Buddha would arguably be more likely to accept a soft 
over a hard interpretation of determinism (Repetti “Meditation”).  
 
Middle-period scholarship 
Whereas early-period scholars tried (unsuccessfully) to circumvent the 
dilemma between determinism and free will, middle-period scholars 
begin to embrace the dilemma and move—partly, in the case of Mark Si-
derits, and fully, in the case of Charles Goodman—toward an incompati-
bilist interpretation of its determinist horn.5 However, they shift the fo-
                                                             
4 See Repetti (“Paleo-compatibilism”) for a more nuanced analysis of the differences 
between fatalism and hard determinism, and between hard and soft determinism; see 
Repetti (Counterfactual) for an extensive argument in favor of soft over hard determin-
ism. 
5 It should be noted that “incompatibilism” has traditionally until recently referred 
solely to hard determinists, on one hand, and “libertarians,” on the other. Libertarians 
and hard determinists are both incompatibilists, because they agree that determinism 
and free will cannot both be true simultaneously. But whereas hard determinists add 
“and determinism is true; therefore, there is no free will,” libertarians add “and we 
obviously have free will; therefore, determinism is false.” More recently, “hard incom-
patibilism” has been used to refer to the more inclusive view that free will is incompat-
ible with both determinism and with indeterminism. We will discuss this view below, as 
Goodman is a hard incompatibilist. I respond in depth to all these views elsewhere 
(“Meditation”; Counterfactual). 
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cus to an element of Buddhist thought that should figure prominently in 
any Buddhist discussion of the issue, that of the Buddhist’s general re-
sistance to the existence of a real self. Siderits and Goodman, the two 
leading scholars in this period, take different tacks here. Siderits argues 
that although the self-presupposing notion of a responsible agent makes 
sense on the pragmatic or conventional level, determinism is a doctrine 
that makes sense on the level of ultimate reality, in which case the two 
prima facie incompatible ideas are “compatible,” but only by virtue of be-
ing elements of different discourse domains. Goodman argues essentially 
that free will is straightforwardly incompatible with determinism from 
the Buddhist’s eliminative perspective of the self because without any 
such entity as a self, if all behavior is impersonally determined there can 
be no such entity as a responsible agent. 
 The writings of middle-period scholars reveal them to be keen 
about the role of the self for the free will and determinism dilemma. In 
my first review of this period (Paleo-compatibilism”), I focused on sever-
al papers published and/or presented by one leading scholar, Mark Si-
derits. These papers proved difficult to interpret properly without refer-
ence to Siderits’s larger treatise on the Buddhist understanding of the 
concept of a person.6 Siderits formulates a “paleo-compatibilist” thesis 
that he does not actually assert, but that he offers simply as a possible 
early Buddhist view that is philosophically interesting.7 That thesis is 
that the Buddhist “two truths” distinction, between conventional reality 
level discourse and ultimate reality level discourse, parses free will and 
moral responsibility (responsible agency) as items of conventional dis-
                                                             
6 Siderits’s papers include “Beyond,” “Buddhism,” “Buddhist,” “Reductionism,” and 
“Expressible,” and his recent conference presentation (Panel); his treatise is Persons. 
7 Siderits takes this general posture—of offering Buddhist ideas as items of potential 
interest to Western philosophers, without asserting them himself—not only in his arti-
cles on free will, but in his major monographs, such as Persons and Philosophy. His writ-
ings on free will, therefore, must be understood within his larger curriculum vitae, using 
that phrase in the broadest sense. 
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course, and determinism as an item of more ultimate discourse. (For a 
rough idea of the differences between these two levels, consider an anal-
ogous distinction in Western thought by comparing “weight,” from con-
ventional discourse, and “mass,” from scientific discourse.) Because they 
do not occur in the same domain of discourse, there can be no real in-
compatibility between the notions of responsible agency and determin-
ism. The claim of incompatibilism, therefore, in erroneously construing 
the items alleged to be incompatible as if they obtain in the same uni-
verse of discourse, commits a kind of syntax error. The reductionist ele-
ment of paleo-compatibilism consists in the claim that facts that obtain 
at the ultimate level ground our use of conventional level concepts, so 
the latter reduce to the former. (Again, think of “weight” and “mass.”) 
Both, therefore, are “sort of” true, so to speak—one straightforwardly, 
literally, or fully, and the other in a pragmatic, perhaps nonliteral sense. 
 Siderits offers paleo-compatibilism as a theory that may be ex-
tracted from the reductionism of pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism. But it should 
be noted that in his larger account of Buddhist metaphysics (Persons) Si-
derits treats Buddhist reductionism as an early stage in a larger dialectic 
that led first to Buddhist antirealism and then to a synthesis of both in 
what he calls “semantic non-dualism.” This view comes close to common 
sense realism—almost returning full circle—but avoids its erroneous el-
ements. In between these two points along the circle, the dialectical pro-
gression Siderits develops—which I will oversimplify greatly—proceeds 
as follows.  
 Analysis suggests first that common sense realism about the real-
ity of partite wholes—the appearance/reality gap-denying view that par-
tite wholes are just as real as they appear to be—is naïve. This recogni-
tion leads to mereological (part/whole) reductionism, the view that less 
real conventional reality discourse level wholes like “chariot” and “per-
son” turn out on analysis to be reducible to more real ultimate reality 
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discourse level parts, the faulty apprehension or understanding of which 
as wholes is an illusory conceptual construction. Ontological nature, so 
to speak, does not carve conceptualization-independent ultimate reality 
at the joints in such a way as to reveal such things as chariots or persons; 
rather, these are at best pragmatically justified conceptual constructions 
and/or projections that make communication and other pragmatic ele-
ments of life practical, relative to our interests and cognitive limitations: 
we typically function as macrolevel beings and interact with the mac-
rolevel features of the world.  
 Reductionism at first makes more sense than common sense real-
ism. On further analysis, however, reductionism is revealed to have its 
own difficulties. Although Siderits focuses on more subtle examples of 
such difficulties, I will illustrate the difficulties of reductionism by way of 
examples that strike me as more pressing, intuitively problematic, and 
didactically transparent. For example, the reductionist faces a logical 
dilemma to the effect that when we “go micro,” so to speak, the analysis 
must either come to an end with impartite indivisibles (genuine “at-
oms”) or else reduction to smaller levels continues ad infinitum—that is, 
reductive analysis leads either to atomism or to nonatomism. But nona-
tomism arrives at no ultimate ground level reality, so there can be no 
support for reductionism’s inegalitarian ontology about wholes in favor 
of parts, on the one hand, and atomism is paradoxical insofar as whatev-
er has magnitude is divisible ad infinitum (which leads to nonatomism). 
But whatever is impartite and indivisible must therefore lack magnitude 
and thus cannot aggregate to form anything with magnitude, in which 
case there can be no perceivable macrolevel reality (even one that is 
partly illusory), on the other hand.  
 Mereological reductionism may be shown (even by the simplistic 
reasoning above) to lead logically to the next stage in the dialectical pro-
gression, antirealism. For mereological reductionism implies that atoms 
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are required for ultimate reality, but the logical analysis just rehearsed 
implies that there are not any atoms. And if there are not, then nothing 
really exists. Obviously, we experience something, but whatever it is, it is 
not objectively real. Antirealism accepts the nonatomistic implication 
that parts are just as unreal as wholes, all the way down, whereby we ar-
rive at an initially more egalitarian ontology—albeit a nihilistic one—in 
which everything is considered equally unreal.  
 Finally, further analysis reveals that even this seemingly ontolog-
ically egalitarian view nonetheless implies the same semantic dualism 
implied by reductionism (insofar as real and unreal remain basic catego-
ries, with the reductionist assigning things to both of them and the anti-
realist assigning everything to just one of them). But the dualism of re-
ductionism and the nihilistic and other difficulties of antirealism are 
both evaded by semantic nondualism, the view that because everything 
is ontologically equal, there is no more basis for ascribing an ontological-
ly negative value of unreal to everything than there is for ascribing an 
ontologically positive value of real to everything, thereby eliminating 
any and all inegalitarian semantics.  
 As I mentioned earlier, Siderits gives the impression that this last 
stage brings us full circle because it implies that common sense realism 
is—from the enlightened perspective of semantic nondualism—
somewhat correct, insofar as parts are no less unreal (or more real) than 
wholes, which implies that wholes are no less unreal (or more real) than 
parts. This completed circle, so to speak, is somewhat reminiscent of, if 
not poetically captured by, the Zen Buddhist adage about behavior being 
ostensibly indistinguishable before and after enlightenment: 
Before enlightenment, chop wood, carry water. After en-
lightenment, chop wood, carry water. (Blackmore 23) 
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But Siderits also suggests that the “enlightened” element of this perspec-
tive absorbs, retains, and is constituted by the insights of each stage 
along the dialectical progression, in such a way that there is an increas-
ing wisdom and explanatory purchase that attends the progression: 
common sense realism is not as enlightened or explanatory as reduc-
tionism, which is not as enlightened or explanatory as antirealism, 
which is not as enlightened or explanatory as semantic nondualism.  
 As for paleo-compatibilism, I mentioned that Siderits offers it on-
ly as a possibly philosophically interesting view based on the reduction-
ist phase of this larger dialectic. It would be interesting to hear more 
specifically how the antirealist and the semantic nondualist conceive of, 
and articulate their understanding of, free will and determinism. For the 
above synopsis implies that they would do so in increasingly enlightened 
and explanatory ways. However, Siderits has not developed the dialecti-
cal implications of antirealism or semantic nondualism for the view of 
free will and determinism held by the paleo-compatibilist.  
 In the present article, I continue to examine the writings of major 
middle-period Buddhist scholars regarding the compatibility of free will 
and determinism, focusing here on the writings of Charles Goodman. 
Most of what Goodman has said about the subject appears in his impres-
sive treatise on Buddhist consequentialism, Consequences of Compassion: 
An Interpretation & Defense of Buddhist Ethics, and ought to be understood 
within the context of Goodman’s larger project in that work, which aims 
to prove that Buddhist ethics is best conceived as a form of consequen-
tialism. There is an intuitive sense in which anyone who accepts hard 
determinism would be pressed in their ethical views either to reject any 
objective basis for ethics, insofar as hard determinism implies nobody is 
ever ultimately morally responsible for what they do, or to embrace 
some form of consequentialism.  
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 The former option—rejecting any objective basis for ethics alto-
gether—is not only prima facie but a fortiori unavailable to Buddhists, giv-
en the ubiquity of moral judgments and moral teachings in most forms 
of Buddhism. The latter option—consequentialism—is consistent with 
hard determinism, given that nothing about consequentialism requires 
that agents be construed as ultimately responsible for their behavior, 
and further given that Skinnerian conditioning and related forms of au-
tonomy-neutral or even autonomy-undermining forms of conditioning 
are obviously consistent with determinism. But the converse is not so 
obvious: that is, despite the nice fit for hard determinists to be found in 
consequentialism, it is not so obvious that being a consequentialist, say, 
entails hard determinism. Goodman’s reasoning, on occasion, threatens 
to blur the lines between these two directions of support, or so I will ar-
gue. 
 Let me paint Goodman’s argument here first in broad strokes. In 
short, Goodman thinks Buddhism accepts hard determinism, the view 
that because determinism is true, there is no free will. He adds a Bud-
dhist twist to this otherwise simple equation by interjecting an interme-
diary premise into the inference: because determinism is true and Bud-
dhism rejects the reality of the self, there is no free will. The idea is that be-
cause there is no “auto” (self), there can be no “nomos” (rule) that can 
govern it—no “autonomos” (self-rule, or autonomy). Given such imper-
sonal determinism, there is nobody who can be a genuinely morally re-
sponsible agent.  
 This is, admittedly, quite a plausible argument on its face, one 
that ought to trouble anyone who believes in the reality of free will and 
who is also inclined to accept much of what seems sensible in Buddhist 
philosophy. However, subsequent Buddhist scholars have apparently not 
been troubled by it. Before we delve into the particulars of Goodman’s 
argument, then, let us continue with the last element of this general in-
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troduction to the literature on Buddhism and free will, by briefly dis-
cussing recent-period scholarship.  
 
Recent-period scholarship 
In the next and final article in this series, I focus on major recent-period 
Buddhist scholarship on free will, as reflected in the writings of Feder-
man (“Buddha”), Harvey (“Freedom”), Gier and Kjellberg (“Buddhism”), 
and Wallace (“Buddhist”). Recent-period scholars seem to agree, contra-
ry to Goodman, that the Buddhist view of self does not necessarily un-
dermine free will. However, whereas in the early period, scholars avoid-
ed hard or soft determinism, and in the middle period they began to 
move toward partial compatibilism/incompatibilism or full incompati-
bilism, recent-period scholars separate along doctrinal lines. Thus, re-
cent-period scholars who address non-Mahāyāna sources embrace de-
terminism and compatibilism, whereas Mahāyāna-oriented recent-
period scholars embrace indeterminism and incompatibilism (Repetti 
“Recent”). But all such recent-period scholars nonetheless embrace 
some form of deflated conception of the empirical or processual self—
contrary to Goodman’s straightforward eliminative stance toward the 
self—and thus endorse a minimalistic conception of free will.  
 Having summarized the bulk of the extant literature on Bud-
dhism and free will, we are now in a better position to assess what the 
other leading middle-period scholar, Charles Goodman, has to say about 
it. Again, Goodman thinks that because Buddhism flatly rejects the reali-
ty of the self, it is consequentialist and deterministic; and because it re-
jects the applicability of attributions of moral responsibility, it is hard 
determinist. 
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Buddhist Hard Determinism 
In the context of his well-argued, comprehensive treatise on Buddhist 
consequentialism, Goodman presents his main argument about free will 
(Consequences chapter eight).8 I focus on this chapter and on some related 
remarks about punishment in chapter nine, in two stages. First, I will 
state Goodman’s view as it originally appears in his text and, in the 
course of so doing, will examine its problematic elements; second, I will 
quote Goodman’s response to my analysis of his account, which generat-
ed from him a more refined version of his views,9 together with my 
counterpoints, followed by my conclusion. 
 
Goodman’s original argument 
I grant Goodman’s arguments for Buddhist determinism, arguendo, but I 
dispute his arguments for Buddhist hard determinism. Goodman argues 
that Buddhism is hard determinist because dependent origination is de-
terminist and on his interpretation of Buddhism there is no self: “If there 
is no autonomous self, there is no autonomy” (149).10 Consider this anal-
ogy, however: “If there is no red apple, there is no red.” Even if compo-
site wholes like apples do not really exist as wholes, there may be nonap-
ple red (composite, partite) things—including whatever it is that we con-
ventionally call “apples.”11  
                                                             
8 This chapter originally appeared as an independent paper (Goodman “Resentment”); I 
discern no substantive difference between the two versions.  
9 Goodman read my objections in a draft of this article and offered his responses to 
those objections; these responses reveal his more refined view (personal communica-
tions, February 2012). 
10 Compare Siderits: “And concerning what, if not persons, could the question of free-
dom be raised?” (“Beyond” 155)  
11 Here I am implicitly appealing to Siderits’s and other Buddhists’ “two truths” (or se-
mantic dualist) distinction between conventional reality level and ultimate reality level 
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 Perhaps what Goodman meant to say is that only a substantive self 
can have substantive autonomy: because there is no substantive self, 
there is no substantive autonomy. In evaluating Siderits’s argument about 
persons and the impersonal “person-series” he argues they reduce to 
(Repetti “Paleo-compatibilism”), however, I concluded that if there are 
no substantive persons (or apples, shoes, and so forth), it is not because 
there are no such entities, but because they are regarded in Buddhist 
philosophy as being ultimately empty. To say that something is empty in 
this sense is to say that it lacks an independent nature, an essential or 
intrinsic nature, or a self-nature. But this means only that it is depend-
ent on the existence of other things—for example, the way my body is 
dependent on the bodies of other organisms—it does not mean that it 
does not exist at all. This interpretation is consistent with both early 
(pre-Mahāyāna, Pāli) and later (Mahāyāna, mostly Sanskrit) Buddhism, 
as seen, respectively, in the Buddha’s (SN 44.10)12 and Nāgārjuna’s 
(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, passim) refusal to either affirm or deny the self. 
The first objection I have to Goodman’s account, then, has to do with his 
unqualified eliminativism about the self or person, whereas, as Siderits 
makes clear (Repetti “Paleo-compatibilism”), and with whom all recent-
period Buddhist scholars seem to agree (Repetti “Recent”), Buddhism 
has a more nuanced, deflationary view of the reductive (and/or semanti-
cally nondualist)—but not eliminative—reality of the person.  
To bring out the nuanced complexity of the Buddhist under-
standing of the unreality of the self somewhat more intuitively, consider 
the analogous issue of the unreality of simple, everyday objects, like red 
                                                                                                                                                       
discourses, as discussed at length in the previous article in this series (“Paleo-
compatibilism”). 
12 “SN” abbreviates the Saṃyutta Nikāya. All references to SN and other elements of the 
Pāli Canon are available free online at the Access to Insight website at 
www.accesstoinsight.com (accessed February 21, 2012) and also the Pali Canon Online: 
The Original Words of the Buddha website available free online at 
http://www.palicanon.org/ (accessed March 26, 2012). 
145 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
apples. Suppose there are no red apples in Buddhist ontology because 
red apples are composite and in Buddhist philosophy composites are 
conceptual fictions because (a) they are constructed from the aggrega-
tion or conjunction of their parts, and (b) what is genuinely real is only 
what exists outside or independent of our conceptualizations. So, in red 
apples’ stead, suppose that what actually exists and gives rise to the 
technically faulty impression or apprehension of red apples may be de-
scribed by an indefinitely long conjunction of quantum level, or dhamma 
level,13 propositions about all the microlevel phenomena that account 
for the faulty red-apple-apprehension-producing-series or “ultimate red 
apple” (shorthand for whatever it is that is presumably more correctly 
described by that indefinitely long conjunction that properly replaces 
the erroneously concept-laden, composite-fiction-involving apprehen-
sion and description of a “red apple”). But it certainly does not follow 
from this kind of implication of the unreality of red apples that there is no 
redness; the inference that suggests that it does follow is invalid. But 
Goodman’s analogous argument—that because there is no autonomous 
self, there is no autonomy—shares this invalid logical form and is there-
fore also invalid. 
 If all perceivable features of whatever it is that we call “red apples” 
appear in the indefinitely long ultimate-red-apple conjunction, there is 
nothing illusory about red apples, properly understood. It is the improper 
understanding of the red apple as a mereological whole—with an independ-
ent nature or essence as such—that is delusory. Absent that sort of mis-
conception, however, it is unproblematic that there are red apples. After 
all, Zen masters eat them after chopping wood, carrying water, and ask-
ing their disciples to fetch them red apples: 
                                                             
13 The lower case term “dhamma” refers to elementary micro constituents of aggre-
gates, in Pāli; “dharma” is Sanskrit. I use “dhamma” only to (acoustically) differentiate 
between it and the upper case “Dharma,” only because “Dharma” is more widely used 
among Anglophone speakers. 
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Before enlightenment, fetch and eat red apples. After en-
lightenment, fetch and eat red apples.  
Here red apples do reduce to ultimate red apples, so mereological elimi-
nativism—declaring the utter nonexistence of apples because they are re-
ductively partite and so forth—is unjustified and excessive, unless the 
claim is made equally about all things’ utter nonexistence. But Goodman 
does not treat everything as equally unreal. He certainly does not treat 
the items that are, so to speak, the central posits in his Buddhist conse-
quentialism—sentience, pleasure, pain, wellbeing, suffering, conse-
quences, and so forth—as utterly nonexistent. If he did, it would be diffi-
cult for him to assert Buddhist consequentialism without contradicting 
himself. 
 This difficulty is not sui generis to Goodman’s account, although 
its underlying basis does seem somewhat widespread—if not endemic—
in Buddhist thought. What is sometimes misleading in Buddhist dis-
course is the pronounced, if not emphatic, vociferous, and unqualified 
denial of the existence of the self, and the sotto voce acknowledgment of 
the sometimes purely technical nonexistence of everything else as well. 
Contrary to this uneven handedness, however unintentional, the issue of 
conventional illusion obtains, properly (univocally) speaking, not tout 
court, but only when certain macrolevel claims about, or properties of, 
certain conventional phenomena do not appear, in effect, as constituted 
by microcomponents in the indefinitely long ultimate reality level con-
junction; for instance, illusion obtains to those features invalidly, but 
conventionally, thought to constitute the essence of a macrolevel entity, 
say, such as ātman, the pre-Buddhist concept of the self as a nonphysical 
soul, where “soul” is itself construed as an otherwise indistinguishable 
element of the infinite, eternally changeless deity of pre-Buddhist Indian 
(Vedanta) philosophy, Brahman. 
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Siderits claimed that early Buddhist psychology treats conven-
tional mental concepts like volition, belief, and desire as reducing to ulti-
mate phenomena, hence as valid, and he claims that on that sort of anal-
ysis the person also reduces to an ultimately impersonal “person-series” 
that consists of ultimately real phenomena as well. However, although 
technically all phenomena are ultimately illusory, the illusory nature of 
the person is given greater emphasis. I propose that the reason for this 
inegalitarian emphasis on the unreality of only one unreal thing among 
all other unreal things is that the erroneous conception of the self as real 
is, according to most—if not all—forms of Buddhism, more deeply impli-
cated in all our pathology. However, the Buddha’s rejection of self was 
not unqualified; rather, it was aimed specifically at the inflated Indian 
concept, ātman.14 The Buddha accepted the deflated, changing, depend-
ent mind (SN 44.10), what Gier and Kjellberg describe as the “empirical” 
or “processual self” (“Buddhism”), without attributing to it any charac-
teristic that could serve as the basis for an essential, independent identi-
ty or unchanging subject of experience that endures unchanged through 
the series of temporal changes that it necessarily undergoes—that is, 
without accepting any false views about its dependently originating, ul-
timately empty nature.  
Why can we not just say that the empirical/processual person re-
duces to the ultimate person-series, just as the red apple reduces to the 
ultimate red-apple-series? Although neither Siderits nor Goodman 
straightforwardly take this approach, it seems Siderits does take it 
somewhat circuitously, insofar as he does say the person reduces to the 
person-series. But most recent-period scholars directly take it for grant-
ed that there is obviously an empirical self, so they seem to bypass the 
                                                             
14 See Federman (“Buddha”) for support of this claim. Federman insightfully compares 
the Cartesian notion of the self with the pre-Buddhist Indian notion of ātman. 
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need for reductionism as a way to get from here to here, so to speak 
(Repetti “Recent”).15 
 Mereological reductionism is not always used in Buddhism to re-
ject the reality of mind, consciousness, belief, volition, craving, action, 
reflection, concentration, mindfulness, compassion, generosity, or any of 
the other (conventional) concepts that are the posits in Buddhist psy-
chology, even though each is significantly conventional but ultimately 
empty. As I intimated earlier, Goodman does not use mereological reduc-
tionism to eliminate sentience, pleasure, pain, wellbeing, suffering, con-
sequences, and so forth, what may be understood as the posits in his 
Buddhist consequentialism. I have examined this asymmetry in connec-
tion with paleo-compatibilism (“Paleo-compatibilism”), but an analogy 
may easily convey the objection. It would seem odd if a Buddhist were to 
make the analogous sort of eliminative argument—there are no Xs in Bud-
dhism; Y presupposes X; therefore, there are no Ys in Buddhism—for any of 
these posits of Buddhist psychology, or if a Buddhist consequentialist 
were to make an analogous sort of eliminative argument for the posits of 
that theory. The analogy is with Goodman’s no-self argument:  
There are no selves in Buddhism; free will presupposes a 
self; thus there is no free will in Buddhism.  
For example, consider the following:  
Nothing in Buddhism is more than momentary; the notion 
of karmic merit presupposes an accumulation by an entity 
that bears fruit over time and that accumulation implies 
something diachronic; thus, there is no karmic merit in 
Buddhism. 
                                                             
15 See also Harvey (“Freedom”) and Federman (“Buddha”) for Theravāda supports for 
this interpretation, and see Gier and Kjellberg (“Buddhism”) for both Theravāda and 
Mahāyāna supports for this interpretation.  
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Consider another example:  
Nothing in Buddhism is more than momentary; the notion 
of a path to enlightenment implies that one undergoes a 
shift from being unenlightened at one instant to being en-
lightened at another point and that presupposes some-
thing diachronic; thus, there is no path to enlightenment 
in Buddhism.  
A more Goodman-specific instance would be, for example:  
Nothing in Buddhism is more than momentary; the con-
cept of a consequence presupposes a causal connection 
between two events over time and that presupposes 
something diachronic; thus, there is no such thing as a 
consequence in Buddhism. 
Buddhists do not normally make these sorts of arguments for the posits 
of Buddhist psychology, and Goodman does not make them for the posits 
of his Buddhist consequentialism, so the mere fact that all such items—
including the self—are conventional cannot be what explains why some 
of them are treated eliminatively and others merely reductively. This is a 
problem for Buddhism in general, but whereas paleo-compatibilism 
treats the person reductively, Goodman treats the self eliminatively, so it 
seems more of an issue for him.  
 As I suggested above, a plausible explanation for the nonunivocal 
treatment of the self, relative to the other posits of Buddhist psychology 
or Buddhist ethics that presumably share the self’s mereological empti-
ness, is that because Buddhist psychology attributes the entire nexus of 
dukkha (the disease of suffering that warrants Buddhism as the prescrip-
tive cure) to the self, the self plays a central role in both of the two 
greatest positions in Buddhism—it is the warrant for the path and the 
path is precisely a path to the self’s eradication. That, I conjecture, is the 
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main reason the unreality of the self is overemphasized relative to the 
less important unreality of the analogous posits of Buddhist psycholo-
gy.16  
 However, as I have argued before (“Paleo-compatibilism”), Bud-
dhist causal arguments for the ultimate reality of any entity arguably also 
apply to the self: Any entity that plays a genuine causal role is ultimately 
real. The (false conception of) self plays the chief causal role in Buddhism’s 
salvific narrative: It is the chief cause of suffering in Buddhism and by 
eliminating this powerful cause the greatest effect in Buddhism—
enlightenment—is achieved. As Loy put it: “It’s no exaggeration to say 
that for Buddhism the self is dukkha” (“Healing” 254). One cannot remove 
a cause, or eradicate something, moreover, that does not exist. Of course, 
these objections are not sui generis for Goodman’s account, but generic to 
Buddhism’s nonunivocal treatment of the unreality of the self as op-
posed to the lesser emphasized unreality of everything else. 
In any event, it is within the causal network of these dependently 
originated psychological entities—beliefs, volitions, karma (technically, 
both actions and their consequences), and so forth—that Buddhist prac-
titioners operate when they struggle on the Buddhist path. For them, the 
free will question is not whether person talk translates to ultimate dis-
course,17 but rather how—within that causal nexus (of beliefs, volitions, 
                                                             
16 I also suspect that in the same way rituals take on a life of their own over time, we 
tend to moralize issues of purity (codifying puritanical norms into morals and vice ver-
sa), as Pinker suggests (“Instinct”). Because Buddhists see the self as the Buddhist 
equivalent of the biblical devil, it is to be expected that the self would receive unequal 
treatment among all other relatively illusory items.  
17 This line of thought is not meant to imply that the question of person to person-
series reduction is not philosophically or soteriologically important. To the extent that 
any correct or incorrect philosophical view, just as any other true or false belief, is a 
guide to felicitous or infelicitous action, respectively, the answer to this philosophical 
question can have serious implications for soteriological practice. It is for this reason, I 
take it, that the Buddha rejected the then prevalent abstract philosophical doctrine of 
fatalism, on the ground that adherence to that doctrine threatened volitional impo-
tence and would undermine the path to enlightenment (Federman “Buddha”). 
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actions)—the right sort of self-regulating abilities needed for the Bud-
dhist path may be cultivated. In the previous article in this series 
(“Paleo-compatibilism”), I listed twenty such items of agent proximal 
self-regulating abilities and identified seven among them (numbered 14-
20), specifically implicit in the pan-Buddhist Eightfold Path, that intui-
tively favor a soft over a hard Buddhist interpretation of determinism. 
Because even if there is no ultimate “person,” my deflationary arguments 
for a Buddhist soft determinism, involving a self-regulating empirical or 
processual self, are plausible, Goodman’s “no self, thus no autonomous 
self” argument is not as persuasive as his presentation of it suggests. 
Goodman offers another argument against autonomy based on 
the Buddhist rejection of the self: “If there is no genuine boundary be-
tween self and other, there can be no genuine distinction between ac-
tions that flow from the self and motions imposed on the self from out-
side” (Consequences 149-150). Let’s call this “Goodman’s no-boundary ar-
gument.” But the same reasoning may be used to reject talk of someone’s 
karma and reincarnation. If Goodman’s no-boundary argument were 
correct, there can be nothing upon which to differentiate between what 
is exogenous and endogenous in order to identify any beings’ merit or 
reincarnational histories—nothing to differentiate between the two in-
terdependent self/other poles in what Fritz Perls, the founder of Gestalt 
psychotherapy (influenced heavily by Buddhism), called the “organ-
ism/environmental field” (Ego 287).  
 Writing on Gestalt theory, Yontef and Jacobs argue that even to-
tally interdependent entities—the kind of entities that Buddhism as-
serts—need identifiable boundaries, in a way that is instructive here:  
In Gestalt theory, there is no self separate from one's or-
ganism/environmental field; more specifically, self does 
not exist without other . . . . The field is differentiated by 
boundaries. The contact boundary has dual functions: It 
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connects people with each other but also maintains sepa-
ration . . . . Connecting meets biological, social, and psy-
chological needs; separation creates and maintains auton-
omy and protects against harmful intrusion or overload. 
(“Gestalt” 352) 
The “contact boundary” is where the organism and its environment 
meet in experience, similar to the Buddhist notion of consciousness as a 
function of perceptual contact between sense organs and objects of per-
ception. Gestalt theory may or may not offer the best account of the or-
ganism/environment distinction or of the analogous self/not-self dis-
tinction, but what is intuitive in its analysis is consistent with dependent 
origination theory and supports the idea that Goodman’s flatly elimina-
tive view of the self and his denial of any distinction whatsoever be-
tween organism and nonorganismic environment is too strong.  
 Thus, to the extent that the self is in an interdependent league 
with such things as beliefs, volitions, and other mental processes and 
phenomena that are, so to speak, on the organism side of the organ-
ism/environment field and, more importantly, among the central ex-
planatory posits of Buddhist psychology, Buddhist psychology seems to 
require a more nuanced view of the person than the flatly eliminative 
view on offer in Goodman’s account. My objections to some of its incom-
pletely articulated elements notwithstanding, such a nuanced view of 
the person may be found already significantly developed along the lines 
proposed by Siderits in Persons.18 
On another note, Goodman critiques Paul Griffiths’s libertarian 
reading of Buddhism (“Notes”). According to Goodman, Griffiths’s read-
ing rests erroneously on the notion of the imprecise predictability of 
                                                             
18 See Repetti (“Paleo-compatibilism”) for a critical review of Siderits’s noneliminative 
model of the person as it relates to the issue of free will. 
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karma. Goodman suggests that Griffiths’s argument is that because the 
predictability of karma is depicted in Buddhist documents in ways that 
are imprecise, Buddhism is not deterministic (because determinism is 
precise, but karma is not). To counter the idea that Buddhism is not de-
terministic, Goodman appeals to certain Buddhist claims about the Bud-
dha’s omniscience, for a Buddha’s omniscience would imply precise pre-
dictability. Because omniscience implies precise predictability, there is 
no inconsistency between the precision predictability implied by deter-
minism and Buddhism. Goodman says if Griffiths is right (to think that 
Buddhism rejects the notion of precise predictability), then Mahāyāna 
views of the Buddha’s omniscience would “give rise to a serious philo-
sophical problem exactly analogous to the conflict between divine fore-
knowledge and human freedom . . . . The fact that Mahāyāna Buddhists 
never . . . mention this problem suggests that . . . they are determinists of 
some kind” (Consequences 151). But the idea that if a belief system has not 
acknowledged a possibly latent inconsistency, it is not latent in that system ap-
proximates Barnhart’s fallacy.19 Because Mahāyāna metaphysics argua-
bly avoids the realism presupposed by the determinism/indeterminism 
dichotomy,20 Mahāyāna nonresistance to the precise predictability of 
omniscience alone does not support determinism any more than it sup-
ports indeterminism, and some Mahāyāna scholars, such as Wallace 
(“Buddhist”) seem to favor indeterminism over determinism, if pressed 
to favor one rather than reject the determinism/indeterminism dichot-
omy. 
                                                             
19 As Michael Barnhart noted (in conversation), Asian philosophers sometimes exhibit a 
“blissful maintenance of contradiction,” so we cannot assume that anyone maintaining 
two beliefs has a belief about their compatibility. I have dubbed the violation of this in-
sight “Barnhart’s fallacy,” and the sort of “compatibilism” inferred simply because two 
beliefs obtain in the same belief system “Barnhart compatibilism” (“Earlier”). 
20 See Gier and Kjellberg (“Buddhism”), and Wallace (“Buddhist”), for an explanation of, 
and some support for, this claim. 
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 Goodman rejects Siderits’s claim that early Buddhists were compati-
bilists on the grounds that what the early Buddhists rejected was fatal-
ism: because fatalism is not hard determinism, early Buddhists did not 
reject hard determinism (Consequences 152-153). But even if they did not 
reject hard determinism on that ground that would not imply that they 
did not or would not reject it on some other ground, say, if they accepted 
some principle that implies that they would reject hard determinism. 
And arguably they did accept a principle with that implication. Although 
hard determinism and fatalism do differ in certain key respects,21 both 
doctrines nonetheless share a consequence that formed the basis of the 
Buddha’s explicit rejection of fatalism, the only one of those two doc-
trines that was in the then prevalent philosophical vocabulary. The 
problem is that belief in inevitabilism engenders volitional impotence. 
The implicit principle that early Buddhists accepted—which implies they 
would reject hard determinism—is this: Reject any doctrine that engen-
ders volitional impotence.22 
Despite Goodman’s reliance on his strong interpretation of the 
no-self doctrine, he arguably presupposes a deflated person concept, and 
soft determinist reasoning about it, when he says that if “through mind-
fulness meditation, a person attains the ability to focus on and reflect on 
                                                             
21 Fatalists think that if an event is fated, nothing anyone does can prevent it. Local fa-
talists think some events are so; global fatalists think all events are so. Fatalism is acausal, 
but determinism is causally necessitated by laws. Global fatalists and determinists agree 
about the one unalterable event series, but for different reasons. Most determinists 
agree that the invariable series runs through causally effective choices, but hard and 
soft determinists disagree about whether agent proximal activities (such as belief, voli-
tion, and so forth) are “up to” the agent enough to count as “free will in the moral-
responsibility-entailing sense,” although some hard determinists doubt mental states 
have causal powers at all; see Caruso (Illusion). Some soft determinists assert counter-
factually that, had prior conditions (volitions, say) been otherwise, then the agent 
could have done otherwise; hard determinists insist conditions can never be otherwise, 
so the alleged ability is never able to be exercised. 
22 For explication and support of this claim, see Harvey (“Freedom”) and Federman 
(“Buddha”). 
155 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
her passing thoughts,” then “she might, over a long time, be able to 
weaken or even eliminate her angry impulses” (Consequences 156; em-
phases added). Goodman’s “person” must be a conventional vernacular 
for something like “processual-person-series,” who he says “can” alter 
her impulses—implicitly attributing to a processual-person-series a per-
son-series-regulating ability: free will without a real self. Given this pre-
supposition of a deflated construal of self-regulating power, she is argu-
ably autonomous in a soft determinist sense, for if she “can” do X, she 
presumably “can” also do not-X,23 and if her reasoning, volitions, etc. re-
garding X versus not-X are handled a certain way, such that she satisfies 
a sufficient amount of the sort of agent proximal criteria soft determin-
ists consider constitutive of deterministic autonomy,24 then she arguably 
has agent proximal abilities soft determinists construe as sufficient for 
free will.  
The debate between hard and soft interpretations of determinism 
is not going to be resolved here, and I do not intend my criticisms to be 
proofs against hard determinism. Rather, my remarks here are meant 
simply to ground the claim that the evidence Goodman appeals to is in-
sufficient to favor a hard over a soft determinist view, and thus that 
from a plausible vantage, Buddhism favors a soft interpretation of de-
                                                             
23 Goodman would not necessarily resist this reasoning, for as we shall see below, he 
states that determinism is not anticounterfactual; that is, he thinks it is consistent with 
determinism that, had antecedent conditions been otherwise, choices would also have 
been otherwise, in which case the notion that alternative courses of action “can” be 
chosen, under alternate circumstances, is not incoherent. But despite this nod in the 
direction of the sort of counterfactual abilities many soft determinists consider consti-
tutive of soft deterministic free will, most hard determinists—Goodman likely includ-
ed—think such abilities can never be instantiated in a deterministic world because in 
such a world alternate conditions never actually occur, in which case his nod in the 
direction of counterfactual abilities is only nominal. 
24 See Repetti (“Paleo-compatibilism”) for a list of these criteria; see Repetti (“Medita-
tion”; Counterfactual) for an expanded articulation of these criteria and a defense of 
their character as constitutive of free will. 
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terminism over a hard one. Such favor is clearly disputed by hard deter-
minists. 
Like Siderits (Repetti “Paleo-compatibilism”), Goodman argues 
that because Śāntideva asserts the impersonality of anger (in his Bodhi-
cāryavatāra chapter 6),25 Buddhism is hard determinist. Śāntideva’s rea-
soning is that just as we do not get angered by the impersonal produc-
tion of bile, we ought not to get angered by other people’s ultimately 
impersonally caused behavior. Śāntideva goes on to suggest that al-
though worldling behavior resembles bile, the Buddhist aspirant ought 
nonetheless to adopt the stance of effective agency for soteriological 
purposes. Goodman goes further in the other direction (away from what 
appears to be Śāntideva’s move toward soft determinism), however, 
when he reasons that Śāntideva’s statements about worldlings’ bile re-
sembling behavior support the rejection of moral responsibility.26 Be-
cause Goodman thinks moral responsibility is interdependent with free 
will (Consequences 154) he concludes that because Buddhism rejects moral 
responsibility (on the ground that there is no self who can be responsi-
ble), it implicitly rejects free will.  
It is not at all obvious, however, that Buddhism rejects moral re-
sponsibility, as too much of Buddhist doxology ties karma intimately to 
(implicit and often explicit) notions of moral responsibility or desert. 
Buddhist interest in free will is not contingent upon responsibility, or 
vice versa, but rather on soteriology. The key questions here are: How 
can I eliminate suffering? How can I cultivate bodhicitta (universal altru-
                                                             
25 Śāntideva’s Bodhicāryavatāra is referenced in the bibliography as Shantideva and 
Padmakara (Bodhisattva); there Śāntideva discusses the impersonal nature of anger in 
his advice on anger control for soteriological purposes. 
26 In Buddhism, a “worldling” is a person who has not attained the first level of direct 
spiritual realization (“stream entry”) through meditative discipline. I use the term 
loosely to refer to most worldly folks and/or all who are not stream entrants, including 
many Buddhists. 
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ism)? Śāntideva’s treatment of the distinction between the bile resem-
bling behavior of worldlings and the agent-stance-adopting (self-
regulating) behavior of Buddhist practitioners is not intended to ground 
a rejection of moral responsibility, but as soteriological advice. As I ar-
gued above, such self-regulating abilities favor soft over hard determin-
ism. 
Let us summarize Goodman’s (responsibility/autonomy) “inter-
dependence argument.” Goodman argues: 
1. Moral responsibility and free will are interdependent; 
2. Buddhism rejects moral responsibility; therefore, 
3. Buddhism rejects free will. 
Only premise 2 and the conclusion involve the propositional attitude 
“rejects”; premise 1 is an unembedded (propositional-attitude-free) 
proposition. This argument is invalid because its first premise assumes 
that Buddhists accept its claim that moral responsibility and free will are 
interdependent; if they do not, it is possible that Buddhists do not have 
reason to draw its conclusion. It is not obvious that Buddhism has con-
ceived moral responsibility and free will as interdependent, much less as 
incompatible, because neither idea has been explicit historically in Bud-
dhism. But even if premise 1 were based upon wide Buddhist acceptance 
of its interdependence claim, apart from the fact that Goodman would 
have his work cut out for him to support that claim, the argument would 
involve something—but not exactly—like a Barnhart fallacy. That is be-
cause this argument attributes an inference to someone on the basis of 
their accepting beliefs that have an implication they may not have real-
ized (especially if they do not accept premise 1), beliefs they might reject 
upon recognition of their incompatibility with a belief they do accept 
(such as free will). There may be weaker, and thus more defensible, ver-
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sions of the claims and conclusion in this argument, but those remain to 
be seen. 
Consider an analogical “identity argument” with a first premise 
stronger than 1’s interdependence claim, that of identity. 
1. Clark Kent and Superman are identical;  
2. Jimmy Olsen thinks Superman flies; therefore,  
3. Jimmy thinks Clark flies. 
Like the interdependence argument, in the identity argument only 
premises 2 and 3 involve a propositional attitude, “thinks”; identity ar-
gument premise 1 is an unembedded (propositional-attitude-free) prop-
osition. Jimmy does not accept identity argument premise 1, however, so 
he does not accept identity argument conclusion 3. This argument is 
equally, but more transparently, invalid. Because both arguments share 
the same general argument form, Goodman’s interdependence argument 
is invalid. 
Goodman’s argument is not only invalid, something that could 
likely be easily remedied with some appropriately modified language, 
but his premises are also weak. Western semicompatibilists, for instance, 
like Fischer (Way), definitively reject premise 1 of the interdependence 
argument. They think determinism rules out autonomy because deter-
minism—in its implication of an unalterable single series of causally ne-
cessitated events—rules out an agent’s access to the sorts of alternatives 
that are connected with the idea of the agent’s literally being able to do 
otherwise than she does, even under the exact same causal conditions. 
They insist that these alternatives are required for the traditional meta-
physical conception of autonomy, according to which it really is ulti-
mately up to the agent (and not prior, nomologically necessitated caus-
es) what the agent will do, but they are only possible in indeterministic 
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worlds. However, they also argue that determinism is nonetheless com-
patible with moral responsibility because determined agents may be suf-
ficiently reason-responsive, that is, responsive to moral reasons, to 
ground morally appropriate attributions of moral responsibility, as op-
posed to attributions justified only on Skinnerian or other consequen-
tialist grounds.27  
To support interdependence argument premise 2, Goodman ap-
peals to authoritative philosophers Śāntideva and Buddhaghosa, who, 
Goodman says, exemplify “a tradition of philosophical arguments being 
used as instructions for meditation” (Consequences 156).28 I am sympa-
thetic to the dual usefulness of meditations and arguments,29 but Siderits 
(“Buddhist”) and I (“Paleo-compatibilism”) disagree with Goodman’s in-
terpretation of the claims of these philosophers, for slightly different 
reasons.  
Goodman thinks that Śāntideva, in advising Buddhists on the ap-
propriate attitude to take toward the anger-provoking, bile-resembling 
behavior of worldlings, evidences a Buddhist attitude of hard determin-
ism. Goodman thinks that Śāntideva’s advice here is meant to serve as 
the grounds for meditative reflection on the impersonality of all behav-
ior, to serve as the basis for the sort of meditatively grounded experien-
                                                             
27 Elsewhere, I have adduced a philosophical fiction or “phi-fi” (pronounced like “sci-
fi”) counterexample of autonomous cyborgs that are incapable of moral reasoning that 
bears on elements of this line of semicompatibilist thought; see Repetti (“Paleo-
compatibilism”). 
28 Here Goodman refers to Śāntideva’s Bodhicāryavatāra (The Way of the Bodhisattva) and 
Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (The Path of Purification). A bodhisattva is one who vows to 
attain enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. 
29 See Repetti (“Meditation”) for a meditation theoretic account of a Buddhist concep-
tion of free will; see Repetti (“Contemplative”) for a defense of a contemplative educa-
tion that uses in-class meditations as the basis for philosophical arguments, and vice 
versa. 
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tial/philosophical insight that will reduce the Buddhist aspirant’s own 
anger. I would agree with this much, but not with the claim that this evi-
dences a hard determinist attitude. Goodman’s interpretation is that the 
production or causation of human behavior is no different from the pro-
duction or causation of bile, and because we are not free to produce or 
not produce bile, we are not morally responsible for doing so, nor for our 
intentional, anger provoking behavior, behavior that we likewise are not 
free to produce or not produce.  
As I argued regarding Siderits’s appeal to the same passages in 
Śāntideva (“Paleo-compatibilism”), Śāntideva’s soteriological instruc-
tions more plausibly favor a soft over a hard deterministic interpretation. 
For, just after Śāntideva’s remarks about the impersonal causation of bile 
resembling behavior (Bodhicāryavatāra 6:22), Śāntideva goes on to con-
sider a hypothetical objection about anger prevention to the effect that 
if all behavior is impersonally caused, it is problematic to suppose that 
the Buddhist can control his own anger at the anger provoking behavior 
of other worldlings. To this objection, Śāntideva replies that the aspirant 
must, in effect, adopt the stance of effective agency in order to make so-
teriological progress along the Buddhist path (6:30). That stance is better 
explained by a soft interpretation of determinism. Thus, there is no obvi-
ous implication of the absence of moral responsibility that Goodman sees 
in these passages from Śāntideva. Goodman’s references to Buddhaghosa 
are similar to those he makes to Śāntideva, so the same argument applies 
to them. 
Goodman offers independent reasons to think there is no moral 
responsibility in Buddhism when he analyzes a canonical example used 
to illustrate how karma connects earlier and later person-series-stages 
in the absence of identity between them. That example involved a ques-
tion that King Milinda and the Buddhist sage Nāgasena consider: wheth-
er or not a man whose candle (held lit in his hand) inadvertently started 
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a fire that burnt down a row of houses was responsible for the damage, 
despite the fact that the candle flame in his hand is not identical to the 
fire it ignited. The point Nāgasena makes is that just as there is an ap-
propriate relationship of causal continuity between the series of flames 
without any identity between them, but responsibility for the burnt 
homes may be traced through the series to the candle flame, so too kar-
ma appropriately connects earlier and later stages in a person-series 
without any enduring person identity that persists throughout the se-
ries. It is odd that Goodman uses this example to argue that there is no 
moral responsibility in Buddhism, insofar as the example seems prima 
facie to have the opposite implication.  
Perhaps Goodman is exhibiting a strategy of tackling the oppos-
ing evidence here, but this would be a questionable strategy in light of 
the ubiquitous evidence that apparently suggests that Buddhism has a 
robust conception of moral responsibility that is intimately intertwined 
with its equally ubiquitous assertions about the operations of karma. 
What Goodman says in defense of his conclusion (that this case supports 
the idea that Buddhism rejects moral responsibility) is that this canoni-
cal example illustrates legal rather than moral responsibility (Consequenc-
es 160). This case may focus on legal responsibility, but that does not 
make it devoid of elements of moral responsibility. Besides, Buddhists 
believe that immoral laws ought to be repealed.  
Of course, even if this case was devoid of an individual’s moral re-
sponsibility, merely offering a case that does not assign moral responsibil-
ity is a far cry, logically speaking, from presenting an argument that 
there are no cases illustrating Buddhist commitment to the concept of 
moral responsibility. Most Buddhists think that examples of this sort 
show that when we experience the karmic repercussions of our former 
behavior, the karmic mechanics that link them ground the claim that we 
deserve those consequences, though we are not exactly the same person 
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that caused the karma. In fact, Siderits makes this claim using just this 
sort of example (“Beyond”). Because desert is arguably a form of moral 
responsibility, Buddhism does not reject moral responsibility, even if 
Buddhist sages advise us to embrace exculpatory attitudes of under-
standing and compassion toward a worldling’s misdeeds, for both that 
being’s sake and our own.  
Further defending his claim that Buddhism rejects moral respon-
sibility, Goodman argues that the law of karma is an impersonal causal 
law, not a moral law (Consequences 161). This is correct, technically, be-
cause if it really is a “law,” akin to the law of the conservation of energy, 
then it is a causal—not a moral—item as such, but that does not mean it 
cannot be both a causal law in one sense and a moral law in another. 
Karmic causation and karmic morals, so to speak, are compatible, and 
the above reasoning suggests that we deserve—are morally responsible 
for—the consequences for which our actions are causally responsible. 
Likewise, causal laws and legal laws are compatible, insofar as my inten-
tionally performing an action that is causally responsible for someone’s 
death makes me legally responsible for their death.  
Moreover, numerous canonical cases depict the Buddha explain-
ing current misfortunes, or predicting karmic effects, in terms that are 
prima facie morally retributive for immoral actions.30 Against this line of 
thought, Goodman also argues (Consequences chapter nine) that Buddhist 
attitudes toward punishment are not retributive, on the general ground 
that there is no autonomous self that can be responsible for its deeds or 
thus serve as an appropriate target for attributions of desert. Goodman 
may have reason to ignore or discount the Buddha’s many transparently 
retributive karmic remarks or to endorse a radically revisionist reading 
of early Buddhism, but what grounds either option is not obvious in 
                                                             
30 See Harvey (Introduction) for an in-depth review of these sorts of cases.  
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what he says. Karmic law functions causally, but its normative compo-
nents dovetail its causal components with far greater precision than 
common sense would predict. Both of these components are, according 
to the Buddha, volitional. The Buddha’s equation of karma with cetanā 
(volition) is congruent with Aristotle’s equation of the praiseworthy and 
blameworthy with the voluntary. Volitions are causally effective (action 
and karma engendering) behaviors that agents at least semivoluntarily 
endorse, whether instinctively or as part of the highly reflective ac-
ceptance of the vow to cultivate bodhicitta.  
Śāntideva also exemplifies a tradition that emphasizes the altruis-
tic enlightenment imperative (bodhicitta) built into the ideal of the bodhi-
sattva, one who vows to attain enlightenment for the sake of all sentient 
beings.31 Buddhist instruction about reducing anger must be interpreted 
by reference to that Mahāyāna ideal, and Goodman rests much of his ar-
gument for Buddhist consequentialism on the element of that ideal seen 
in the axiomatic Buddhist view that the wellbeing of all sentient beings 
is morally fundamental. Throughout Consequences, Goodman uses conse-
quentialist reasoning to support the idea that whatever promotes that 
good has positive moral value. Thus, the main—if not only—ground on 
which a Buddhist consequentialist should reject moral responsibility 
would, presumably, be if holding people morally responsible caused 
more harm than good. Goodman exhibits this reasoning when he says 
that “blameworthy actions are not those that are wrong, but those that 
it would have good consequences to blame” (154).  
If this is so, then the question of whether Buddhism rejects moral 
responsibility is no longer a question with metaphysical presuppositions 
about whether or not agents are sufficiently causally responsible for their 
actions in ways that would ground attributions of moral responsibility. If 
                                                             
31 His text, which Goodman focuses on, Bodhicāryavatāra (The Way of the Bodhisattva), is a 
manual for aspiring bodhisattvas. 
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their deliberative, volition regulating and other behaviors exhibit fea-
tures rendering them competent as legally sane agents, on Goodman’s 
view the question instead would be about the likelihood of overall well-
being attending the institution of holding people morally responsible. 
But the answer to that kind of question does not seem to be something 
entailed by or even extractable from Buddhist doctrine, notwithstanding 
however interested in that answer Buddhists might be. 
By my lights, in guaranteeing precision retribution for wrong ac-
tions, the law of karma undermines the idea that “blameworthy actions 
are not those that are wrong.” It would be odd if karmic law—something 
Goodman insists is causal, which implies it is built into the fabric of the 
way things are universally—was precisely retributive, as it appears in 
Buddhist doxography to revolve explicitly around merit, but Buddhism 
rejected desert. It seems a priori that there can be no merit without de-
sert. Presuppositions of desert also reach far into related notions, such as 
entitlement to acquire possessions, as opposed to theft, for example, as in 
the Buddhist prohibition against taking what is not given. Intuitively, 
nobody deserves what is neither theirs nor freely given, sold or appro-
priately transferred to them by someone else.  
Consequentialists tend to avoid backward looking, desert based 
notions like merit, blame, and so forth, and to embrace forward looking 
considerations like rehabilitation, deterrence, and the like. Goodman is 
explicit about this in the case of Buddhist consequentialism (Consequenc-
es chapter nine). But it seems problematic for a Buddhist consequential-
ist to prefer deterrence to blameworthiness (which is based on desert), 
but to retain praiseworthiness (which is based on merit)—not that there 
are never reasons to ignore backward looking considerations or to em-
brace forward looking ones. Rather, the problem is with the asymmetry 
in the Buddhist consequentialist’s rejection of blame and the like in the 
face of the Buddhist acceptance of praise and the like, when both types 
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of reactive attitudes presuppose desert. Either can have forward looking 
consequences; positive and negative conditioning in the form of praise 
or blame presumably have symmetrical likelihoods of reinforcing what is 
praised and preventing what is blamed, respectively, and thus they 
ought to be regarded equally from a Buddhist consequentialist perspec-
tive, other things being equal.  
Sometimes other things are unequal, no doubt. Thus, there are 
conceivably cases where better consequences attend the practice of not 
holding some blameworthy people morally responsible, or of praising 
people who do not merit praise, but it is doubtful that all (or even most) 
cases have or would have that result. Certainly, no act utilitarian has a 
priori grounds for thinking any particular action type is necessarily anti-
thetical to a good consequentialist outcome, for there will always be an 
imaginable hypothetical scenario in which that action type can be rigged 
so its performance brings about the greater good. On the rule utilitarian 
side, the institution of holding people morally responsible—both positive-
ly and negatively, as in praise and blame—has the prima facie credentials 
that accrue to almost any institution that exists ubiquitously as such for 
millennia across all cultures, as well as its massively intuitive appeal in 
preserving social order.  
It is no accident that the majority of people throughout history, 
Buddhists included, believed that we deserve the repercussions of our 
deeds. For character consequentialists (such as Goodman), who accord 
certain character traits positive value (qua virtues) as well as pride of 
place in their consequentialism, the disposition of holding ourselves and 
others morally responsible is arguably supportive of character cultiva-
tion (which arguably involves autonomy theoretic self-regulation), 
which promotes the overall good of sentient beings. If we couple Good-
man’s absolute rejection of the self and of autonomy with his rejection of 
reactive attitudes and the institution of moral responsibility, a pressing 
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question comes to the fore: If we are all just along for the ride (nonauton-
omous), if there are no real self/other boundaries, and if the institution 
of holding ourselves morally responsible is irrational, then what is to 
prevent anyone—rationally or morally—from doing anything they feel 
like doing? 
 However, on Goodman’s behalf, it should be noted that Wolf 
(Freedom) defends a praise/blame asymmetry—not on consequentialist 
grounds, but precisely on grounds of desert. Because agents that commit 
wrong actions are not reason-responsive (if they were, she argues, they 
would commit right actions), they are not responsible or blameworthy 
for their deeds; but agents who perform good deeds are reason-
responsive, so they are responsible and praiseworthy for their deeds. 
Though both types of behaviors are equally determined, only reason-
responsive, right action involving deeds ground desert presupposing re-
active attitudes, such as praiseworthiness. This argument might fit in 
well with Goodman’s theoretical framework, but it may not get him eve-
rything he seems to want. 
 The asymmetry in Wolf’s argument revealingly parallels the 
asymmetry in Śāntideva’s treatment of those nonblameworthy, anger 
provoking, bile resembling (not self-controlling) worldlings versus those 
praiseworthy, anger transcending, not bile resembling (self-controlling) 
Buddhists. Numerous authoritative Buddhist texts assign karmic pun-
ishments in hells to the former and karmic rewards in heavens to the 
latter. Granted, the skillful use of hyperbole is itself justified on conse-
quentialist grounds, as is the use of the whiplash of fear and of the carrot 
of enticement. But the association between these positive and negative 
values and their backward looking bases in an agent’s actions that 
ground their desert are more difficult to explain away. 
 This asymmetry may still be justifiable on Buddhist consequen-
tialist grounds. As I have argued in connection with Wolf’s asymmetry 
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thesis (Counterfactual): (a) blame generally causes suffering; (b) praise 
generally causes wellbeing; (c) perceived undeserved blame generally 
causes more pain than perceived undeserved praise (whether those per-
ceptions are correct or not); (d) undeserved praise generally supports 
happiness and wellbeing; and (e) undeserved blame generally causes far 
more pain and suffering than any that may be caused by deserved or 
perceived blame or by deserved, perceived, or undeserved praise. No 
Buddhist should be unhappy about the idea of spreading joy to all sen-
tient beings, regardless of their merit. Thus, it very well may be justifia-
ble for Buddhists to eliminate blame but retain praise.  
 Be that as it may, however, none of this speaks to whether or not 
desert is a cognitive error, and unless that can be shown, the mere fact 
that it may be palatable—if not, ironically, praiseworthy—to generously 
ascribe praise to the undeserving, if people generally are appropriate 
targets of ascriptions of desert, then the distribution of judgments re-
garding some of the items (a) through (e) above will come out different-
ly. In that case, deserved praise and blame alone are straightforwardly 
justified, whereas perceived or undeserved praise and blame are not. 
There may be another way to avoid the asymmetry problem, by 
rejecting not only negative reactive attitude responses to behavior, such 
as blame, but also positive reactive attitude responses, such as praise. In 
fact, Goodman seems to move in that direction when he asserts that 
from an enlightened perspective, “all the reactive attitudes are entirely 
irrational and unjustified” (Consequences 159). Arguably, however, grati-
tude, appreciation, and certain other reactive attitudes seem just as ra-
tional and justified from an enlightened perspective as the appropriate 
reactive attitude responses of mudita (sympathetic joy or appreciation) 
and bodhicitta toward the happiness and suffering experienced, respec-
tively, in connection with the experiences of all sentient beings.  
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Perhaps anticipating and speaking against this possible line of 
reasoning, Goodman adds (in the same paragraph) that the Buddha 
would not be “tormented by remorse.” But this is a misleading exaggera-
tion, for two reasons. First, it suggests that the Buddha lacked any ele-
ments of remorse whatsoever, but it is difficult to suppose that the Bud-
dha lacked the sympathetic appreciation of the pain he may have caused 
others in his previous births or prior to his enlightenment, which appre-
ciation is arguably an element of a type of wholesome, balanced remorse 
toward which Buddhists seem committed. After all, the altruistic ele-
ment of bodhicitta seems to require a sympathetic appreciation of others’ 
pain. Second, it misleadingly couples—if not conflates—the notion of the 
Buddha’s balanced, wholesome remorse with the implicit idea that if the 
Buddha had any remorse at all, he would be “tormented” by it, but that 
is equally difficult to imagine, given that the Buddha is by definition free 
of pathology and thus immune to self-torment. I am pretty sure the Bud-
dha experienced wholesome remorse, but not the unwholesome extremes 
of being “tormented” by remorse, on one hand, or of heartless indiffer-
ence, on the other, upon realization of the dukkha inflicted by him on 
sentient beings during his many previous incarnations—his ironically 
“praiseworthy” most recent incarnations as an exceedingly self-
sacrificing bodhisattva notwithstanding. 
 Goodman reasons that the radical nature of this revisionism 
about reactive attitudes suggests hard determinism (Consequences 158). 
But it is not inconsistent with soft determinism. Goodman also argues 
that no doctrine that presupposes the legitimacy of reactive attitudes 
and is thus so opposed to compassion (which is so central to Buddhism) 
“should be regarded as a part of Buddhism” (162). But this “no true 
Scotsman” type reasoning ignores the many respected Buddhists who 
embrace desert, thinking that cosmic (karmic) law turns on and thus 
guarantees the reality of desert. It also implicitly mischaracterizes Bud-
dhist soft determinists as rejecting compassion because they accept 
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moral responsibility; surely there are those with such beliefs whose pri-
mary meditation techniques include metta (loving kindness meditation). 
Among them would be Theravāda Buddhists (the only surviving tradi-
tion of pre-Mahāyāna Buddhists), who practice metta regularly, for Ther-
avāda scholars who have written on the Buddhist view of free will favor 
a compatibilist or soft determinist reading. Goodman’s “no true Scots-
man” move, therefore, seems to imply that Theravāda Buddhists are not 
true Buddhists, ignoring the fact that metta itself—not unlike mudita, 
karuṇā (compassion), and bodhicitta—is an appropriate reactive attitude.  
 Let us pause to contemplate the claim that these latter items are 
reactive attitudes. Although these virtuous dispositions—metta, mudita, 
karuṇā, and bodhicitta—are not typically thought of as “reactive atti-
tudes” within Buddhism, this is merely because Buddhism does not typi-
cally use this relatively recent Western philosophical jargon. The differ-
ence between these kinds of reactive attitudes and those typically dis-
cussed in Western philosophy—envy, resentment, regret, and the like—
involves a contingency of two different universes of philosophical dis-
course. Western philosophers are not primarily concerned with Buddhist 
soteriology, so it is just not the case that they are likely to use loving 
kindness, sympathetic joy, or infinite compassion as examples of reac-
tive attitudes when they are using casuistry to bolster their theoretical 
agendas. The term “reactive” also seems antithetical to how Buddhism 
would prescribe how we respond to worldlings and their behavior—
namely, mindfully, compassionately, and so forth. But these accidents of 
usage aside, the main thing that separates envy, vengeance, and so forth 
from generosity, altruism, and their like is that the former are negative 
and the latter positive.  
 Buddhists might, in fact, go a step further and say that metta, 
mudita, karuṇā, bodhicitta and the like are more than just positive; they 
are arguably what the enlightened advocate as the most appropriate re-
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active attitudes, and what makes them most appropriate from the en-
lightened perspective is their implicit recognition of the underlying 
metaphysical unreality of the self. Because this is at least the case when 
enlightened beings exhibit or advocate these attitudes, they may be con-
sidered enlightened reactive attitudes, or at least enlightenment-
approximating reactive attitudes. But if such enlightened attitudes are 
grounded in an underlying metaphysical truth (namely, ultimate reality, 
as perceived by the enlightened), then they are appropriately targeted at 
all beings that lack a self, in which case they are—however enlightened—
still reactive attitudes, although perhaps it would be more appropriate to 
call them “responsive” attitudes. In other words, those to whom respon-
sive attitudes are appropriately directed deserve to be responded to in 
these ways, on the metaphysical grounds that they lack a self.  
 I have argued in some detail for a Buddhist view of free will and 
responsibility that is grounded in this sort of perspective (“Meditation”), 
which I sum up as what may be described as Dharma-responsiveness.32 
Dharma-responsiveness is analogous to the semicompatibilist’s notion of 
reason-responsiveness. On that model, as one increasingly approximates 
Dharma-responsiveness (only enlightened beings are fully Dharma-
responsive), both one’s relative autonomy and responsibility increase, 
although—paradoxically—upon enlightenment, one transcends both be-
cause one ceases to exist as a separate entity (Repetti “Meditation”). Ac-
cordingly, a “true” Buddhist may hold that desert rationally grounds the 
responsive attitudes that, together with other factors, constitute the ap-
propriate Buddhist stance of Dharma-responsiveness in general. 
                                                             
32 “Dharma” (Sanskrit; Pāli: Dhamma”) is difficult to translate, and has many different 
meanings based on usage, but may mean any of the following: the way things are; the 
teachings of the Buddha(s); the universal pattern or way; the truth or the path to its 
realization; and so on. In light of the definition of this term to describe the way things 
are, and in light of the fact that the law of karma is part of the way things are, it is all the 
more difficult to avoid the Buddhist implication that desert is part of the way things are. 
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Near the conclusion of his chapter on free will, referring to the 
hopes of Buddhists for reaching enlightenment, Goodman adds:  
The confidence Buddhists have in the power of their med-
itative practices leads them to be very optimistic about 
the practical possibility of such a transformation, despite 
the obvious difficulty of the task. (163)  
True, but as I hope my arguments have made plausible, such talk about 
the power we have to intentionally change our futures seems intuitively 
more supportive of a soft rather than a hard deterministic interpretation 
of Buddhist thought. I have argued this elsewhere (“Paleo-
compatibilism”; “Meditation”) and it is also what Peter Harvey (“Free-
dom”) and Asaf Federman (“Buddha”) seem to think.33 
In his chapter on punishment (Consequences chapter nine), Good-
man argues that Buddhist consequentialism does well without the back-
ward looking, retributive notion of punishment, which rests on the au-
tonomy assuming notion of desert he rejects. He thinks that it can ac-
commodate all the essentially desert-free intuitions required of a for-
ward looking (deterrent, rehabilitative, and incapacitation involving) 
notion of punishment capable of preserving social order (168). It does 
not follow, however, that there is no room in Buddhist consequentialism 
for a wholesome, desert based interpretation of retributivism, as I ar-
gued above. Insofar as the law of karma guarantees that everyone gets 
what they deserve, it is arguably part of the Dharma; it is the way things 
are; it is the cosmic law of desert. 
Goodman makes some interesting remarks about punishment 
that are directly related to free will. Goodman asserts: 
                                                             
33 See also Repetti (“Recent”), for my critical review of Federman’s and Harvey’s argu-
ments, along with those of Gier and Kjellberg, and of Wallace. 
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In particular, the view about free will that seems to be 
most consistent with the retributivist account of punish-
ment is . . . libertarianism . . . . Since . . . they reject liber-
tarianism, hard determinists would have reason to oppose 
a retributive conception of punishment. (168)  
Perhaps hard determinists would have some reason thereby, but just be-
cause retributivism is consistent with libertarianism does not mean that 
all who reject libertarianism must also reject retributive models. That is 
because retributivism is consistent with Western compatibilism (which 
includes soft determinism) and semicompatibilism, both of which reject 
libertarianism. Thus, Buddhist aversion to retributivism need not favor 
hard determinism over soft. 
 Goodman offers another argument for Buddhist hard determin-
ism on reactive attitude grounds:  
Buddhists are specifically hard determinists, not compati-
bilists, because they claim that anger and resentment are 
never justified, and that these negative emotions can be 
undermined by reflection on the impersonal causal pro-
cesses that underlie the production of other people’s 
harmful actions. (169) 
But Buddhist compatibilists and semicompatibilists may make the same 
claims about the unjustifiability or soteriological inappropriateness of 
anger and resentment, and they are arguably in a better position to ac-
count for such self-transformative abilities, as I have argued briefly 
above and extensively elsewhere (“Paleo-compatibilism”; “Meditation”).  
 Goodman reviews several authoritative sources that support the 
idea that we ought to have compassion for evildoers because they are 
afflicted (Consequences 169-171). Here he repeats Nāgārjuna’s remark: 
“Those of fallen nature are receptacles [of] compassion from those 
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whose natures are magnanimous” (Consequences 171). Arguably, those 
fallen natures are receptacles of compassion because their self-inflicted 
bondage and suffering-fostering actions created the metaphorical recep-
tacle into which compassion appropriately may be poured. But then, as I 
argued above, such pathologically determined actions ground sympa-
thetic reactive attitudes and thus they deserve the compassion that the 
magnanimous, being Dharma-responsive, naturally extend.34 
 Goodman presupposes this sort of implicit notion of karmic de-
sert when he argues that “both Plato and the Buddhists maintain that 
there will be future lives in which our fate will be determined by the 
moral quality of our actions in this one” (175). This betrays, as I have 
been arguing, the tacit presence of desert if not also of retributivism in 
the universality of karmic law. If the law of karma guarantees retribu-
tion and desert, then a form of moral responsibility is built into the fab-
ric of reality. The Buddhist can point to this as grounds for there being 
no need for our engaging in superfluous retributive practices, also because 
these generate more bad karma for everyone, ourselves included. Be-
cause these arguments provide Buddhists sufficient reason to reject hu-
man retributive behavior without rejecting desert or moral responsibil-
ity, we do not need hard determinist premises to support the rejection of 
retributive behavior. But we also do not wind up with what Goodman 
                                                             
34 This line of reasoning evokes a deeper, more problematic asymmetry: If the universal 
karmic law—part of the way things are—guarantees retribution, and enlightened beings 
are not separate from the way things are, then why does one part of the Dharma re-
spond with retributive karmic consequences and another with compassion and the 
like? One possible way to go about answering this would be to say that the Dharma is 
impersonal, just as Goodman argued insofar as it is on that level purely causal. Whereas 
the magnanimous, seeing and knowing that this retributive suffering is built into the 
natural progression of sentient beings along the path to enlightenment, all the more 
offer their compassion to those pathologically self-torturing beings. Although this ini-
tially sounds like a possible direction of explanation for this asymmetry, on further 
analysis the difficulty remains: Why is it that enlightened beings are more compassion-
ate than the Dharma, if there is no self/other boundary—as Goodman suggests earlier—
and therefore no difference between them and the Dharma? 
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needs to support his interdependence argument, and that is a Buddhist 
rejection of moral responsibility. On the contrary, moral responsibility 
appears to be part of the Dharma. 
 In responding to the objection that consequentialism permits 
punishment of the innocent, Goodman differentiates between earlier 
(mainly Theravāda, but also Śāntideva) and later sources (mainly 
Asaṅga) to dodge this problem. However, in so doing he seems to pre-
suppose intuitions based on desert when he says the “innocent are in no 
need of reform,” that deterrence “cannot work if people believe they are 
in danger of punishment whether or not they break the law,” or that “we 
can rule out the possibility of punishing the innocent without having to 
accept that the guilty deserve punishment” (176). For if hard determin-
ism is true, nobody is truly guilty—responsible—for anything they do, 
because all relevant causal explanation is agent exogenous or agent in-
different. Therefore, if everyone is “innocent,” then nobody is “in need 
of reform” and deterrence “cannot work . . . whether or not they break 
the law” (defining “the law” in the broader sense of the moral law of 
karma and, even more generally, the Dharma). This is arguably an indi-
rect proof of the superiority of soft over hard determinism, for the for-
mer can more coherently distinguish between the guilty and the inno-
cent, as well as ground desert based retributivism. For if hard determin-
ism is true, no one is guilty and everyone is innocent. 
Goodman’s refined argument 
Let me now reveal Goodman’s replies to these objections, along with my 
rebuttals.35 Goodman insists that a proper reading of his view must take 
into consideration the fact that, as he sees it, the hard determinist view 
does not conflict with deterrence working, with people being able to 
                                                             
35 The claims to follow about Goodman’s replies to my objections, as well as about his 
more refined position, derive from personal communication (Goodman February 2012). 
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change, with anger being evitable, or with some people being in need of 
reform. Any criticism that consists of pointing out these seeming con-
tradictions does not, he thinks, reach the view he intended to put for-
ward and defend. But the force of my objections was not directed at 
showing that these ideas were inconsistent with hard determinism, but ra-
ther at assessing the individual plausibility of various elements or their 
collective coherence. Goodman’s overall Buddhist position contains not 
only a hard determinist component, but also his strongly eliminative 
view of the self, his consequentialism, certain inferences that seem not 
to stand up under scrutiny, and some presuppositions he is not entitled 
to hold. Let us take a closer look at these claims, then. 
 As Goodman sees it, the hard determinist position that he attrib-
utes to the Buddhist tradition consists of the following “three theses”:  
1. Determinism is true: that is, whatever happens is 
completely determined by previous causes. 
2. Because determinism is true, there is no such thing as 
basic desert, that is, desert of good or bad treatment 
that is justified by retributivist, backward looking con-
siderations and not by consequentialist considera-
tions. 
3. Because determinism is true and there is no basic de-
sert, all reactive attitudes are cognitively mistaken 
and always inappropriate, though they might some-
times happen to have good consequences in special 
situations. (Goodman personal communication, Febru-
ary 2012) 
However, I think either thesis 1 begs the question insofar as it equates 
determinism with hard determinism or else the inference from thesis 1 
to thesis 2 is invalid, as soft determinists accept thesis 1 but doubt thesis 
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2. This line of thought also seems to presuppose two ideas Siderits num-
bers as “(3)” and “(4)” and lists among four statements that he describes 
as paleo-compatibilist theses:  
(3) Nothing could be an originating cause in the required 
sense.  
(4) All psychological states are the effects of prior causes. 
(Siderits “Buddhist”) 
I have argued that (3) and (4) are false (“Paleo-compatibilism”).  
I have two responses to Goodman’s reasoning here. First, the fact 
that agent proximal causes are traceable back to causes that are them-
selves ultimately exogenous does not necessarily undermine the possi-
bility that agents are originating causes in the responsibility-entailing 
sense. Second, Goodman holds that the issue between hard and soft de-
terminists is normative, not metaphysical. Given this assumption, how-
ever, Goodman seems required to accept the semicompatibilist view that 
determinism is inconsistent with the metaphysical conception of auton-
omy (that consists in the ability to do otherwise, an ability arguably only 
able to be manifest in indeterministic worlds), but consistent with the 
normative requirements of moral responsibility (that consist simply of 
an agent’s exhibiting reason-responsiveness). 
Goodman thinks that nothing about his three theses (1-3) con-
flicts with the conventional truth of the claim that people can change 
their lives. Goodman argues that theses 1-3 do not conflict with a claim 
like “It is possible for X to arise, and if X is present, X causes psychologi-
cal state Z to arise,” or “It is possible for X to arise, and if X is present, X 
causes psychological state Y not to arise”; according to Goodman, claims 
like these, when correct, can make claims like “George can change his 
wicked ways” conventionally true. What theses 2 and 3 imply, for Good-
man, is that if George changes his wicked ways, he will not deserve (in 
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the basic sense) any praise or reward for this, though he might deserve 
them in the consequentialist sense that it would make things better (for 
both George and the world) to praise and reward him. Likewise, if George 
does not change his wicked ways, theses 2 and 3 imply that George will 
not deserve (in the basic sense) blame or punishment for this, though we 
might be required to blame or punish him for consequentialist reasons, 
to avoid further harm to society; and that if we get angry at George for 
not changing, our anger will be mistaken.  
However, although nothing in theses 1-3 conflicts with Good-
man’s examples, his examples (as described) avoid the issue—crucial to 
the discussion of whether George deserves to be held responsible for his 
deeds—of whether it is in George’s power to bring it about that X arises. 
For 1-3 conflict with other examples that do draw in elements of this fea-
ture of the discussion, such as, “George did not do his philosophy essay 
on time, but he could have, so he deserves the late penalty,” a sentence 
that can also be conventionally true (not just in the consequentialist 
sense) if George satisfies enough of the soft determinist’s agent proximal 
criteria and thus has the ability to bring it about that X arises, which im-
plies that George can behave in ways that ground normative attributions 
of praise, blame, desert, and so forth. 
Frankfurt considered the case of a determined agent who intui-
tively seems morally responsible for what he did because he would have 
done what he did even if he was not determined to do it (that is, even if 
he was able to do otherwise). He famously argued that being determined 
to do what one does need not undermine attributions of moral responsi-
bility.36 Although some metaphysical issues are not relevant in the 
                                                             
36 See Frankfurt (“Alternate”) for the locus classicus of this sort of case that has been so 
duplicated in the Western discussion of free will that they are now called “Frankfurt 
Cases.” In the original case, an agent, Jones, is under the remote control of a neurosci-
entist, Black, who has secretly implanted a chip in Jones’s brain, and who will intervene 
only if Jones attempts to behave in a way that goes against Black’s preferences, say, in 
the voting booth. Supposing that Black wants Jones to vote for the Democrat, and that 
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Frankfurt Case, such as the truth or falsity of determinism, others are 
relevant, such as the fact that the agent in the case satisfies the following 
criterion: he would have done likewise even if he was able to do other-
wise (Repetti “Paleo-compatibilism” 80). This is a metaphysical issue in-
sofar as it raises the question of whether counterfactuals ground ability 
statements, and in this sense the normative issues can rest on the meta-
physics. Semicompatibilists implicitly agree, as their entire argument—
that determined reason-responsiveness can ground moral responsibil-
ity—presupposes it, for the only way to understand attributions of rea-
son-responsiveness (along with all other dispositions) is by way of coun-
terfactual analyses, something semicompatibilists have coming out of 
their ears.37 
 Goodman admits that the conventional truth of at least some in-
terpretations of the sentence “George can change his wicked ways” is 
compatible with determinism, and that determinism is not “actualism” 
(the view that only what actually ever occurs is possible).38 As Goodman 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jones votes for the Democrat “of his own accord,” that is, without Black intervening at 
all, Frankfurt reasons that Jones would have voted for the Democrat even if he was able 
to vote otherwise, in which case the fact that Black stands by ready to prevent that 
from ever happening and thus that Jones cannot do otherwise (and thus that Jones 
lacks genuine alternatives) is irrelevant to Jones’s moral responsibility. Jones acted 
freely, in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense, despite being determined. 
37 See Repetti (Counterfactual) for the full analysis that supports this claim, and the re-
lated objection to the effect that the same counterfactual analyses that ground reason-
responsiveness ground related soft determinist (thus full compatibilist, not merely sem-
icompatibilist) conceptions of autonomous agency, such as the criterion just men-
tioned: the agent would have done likewise even if she was able to do otherwise. Agents 
that satisfy this and related criteria arguably may possess autonomy even in determin-
istic worlds. Therefore, on careful analysis of the counterfactual grounds of semicom-
patibilism, the need to restrict compatibilism to only the moral responsibility ele-
ment—while holding the autonomy element incompatible—collapses, and thus the war-
rant for the “semi-” qualifier collapses with it. 
38 See Repetti (“Meditation”; “Paleo-compatibilism”) for an explanation of actualism 
and how actualism is incompatible with determinism; see Repetti (Counterfactual) for a 
full explication of actualism and a proof of how it undermines the incompatibilist’s 
main argument, the so called “consequence argument” to the effect that determinism 
rules out alternatives and thus also rules out alternatives-requiring metaphysical con-
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has it, everything that happens is determined, but if the conditions had 
been different, a different result would have emerged. And changing 
conditions, both internal and external, produce changes in people’s 
characters all the time. This is a common strategy of late among hard 
determinists: Accept all the claims about local, agent proximal features 
of action that soft determinists associate with moral-responsibility-
entailing free will, but insist that because all of that is ultimately exoge-
nously and thus impersonally determined (adding, typically, “long be-
fore the agent was conceived”), none of it is agential enough, so to speak, 
to properly ground attributions of responsible agency. The clincher is 
the added observation to the effect that because determinism is true, 
antecedent conditions never are otherwise, in which case the technical 
truth of agent proximal counterfactuals about how choices could have 
been otherwise had their antecedents been otherwise does not amount 
to anything the agent can get her hands on in order to alter her (ancient-
ly determined) experience.  
 But this general hard determinist strategy strikes me as simply 
taking the distal, preagential vantage of ancient causes that lead like un-
alterable dominoes to the agent’s choice, from which vantage one can-
not see clearly (and thus ignores) the relevant features of those agent 
proximal facts that ground the idea that the agent exhibits the sort of 
volitional regulation that soft determinists consider sufficient for auton-
omous, responsible agency. And because we do not see those facts clear-
ly we say they do not really make a difference. But this is fallacious. Cer-
tainly, if we stand far enough away from something, we will not see it 
clearly enough to discern its important features; but that does not mean 
                                                                                                                                                       
ceptions of autonomy that imply that agents can do otherwise than they do. Because 
the incompatibilist element is what differentiates semicompatibilism from full compat-
ibilism, and that element is grounded in the consequence argument, the semicompati-
bilist is implicitly committed to the actualism of the consequence argument, and thus 
technically not entitled to counterfactual (nonactualist) analyses. 
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that they do not exist. A distant tower that looks from afar as though it 
were topped by a stationary cross might actually be topped by a func-
tional weathervane, the structural features of which matter because they 
render it wind-responsive, unlike the cross. 
These ideas are more in the general background of hard deter-
minism than in the specific foreground of Goodman’s Buddhist version. 
But I think Goodman’s version contains an inconsistency insofar as he 
thinks the conventional truth of the statement “George is guilty of mur-
der” is compatible with hard determinism. What Goodman denies is that, 
given that George is guilty of murder, George is ultimately responsible for 
murder in a sense that would make anger or resentment an appropriate 
response to his actions, or in a sense that would generate basic desert. 
But here is where soft determinist intuitions seem to have the lead over 
hard determinist ones: if George is guilty of murder (which requires mal-
ice aforethought and so on), then he is deserving of punishment, and an 
appropriate target of our reactive attitudes; conversely, if he is not de-
serving of punishment or an appropriate target of our reactive attitudes, 
then he is not guilty of murder. That is, if George’s agent proximal behav-
ior is gobbled up by distal prenatal forces, as the hard determinist thinks 
it is, then the hard determinist cannot really consider “George” to be 
“guilty” of anciently caused events that merely occur in the vicinity or 
through the conduit of his agent proximal conditions. For “George” is no 
more of a real agent, on Goodman’s strongly eliminative view, than a 
snowball is, and a snowball cannot be “guilty” of hitting something to 
which forces beyond its control propel it. 
If—by analogy with hard determinism—one attributes all causal 
explanatory force for everything that happens within, and in the wake 
of, an avalanche to the avalanche (or to its immediate cause), then that 
explanatory apparatus will gobble up local causal conditions that none-
theless might explain how features of one relatively small chunk of snow 
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in the avalanche (that suffice to identify that snow chunk as an entity 
that may be called “Frosty”) are thereby “guilty” of helplessly rolling 
over a skier, causing the skier’s demise. From such a “hard avalanche” 
type perspective, the claim that Frosty is guilty of homicide is implausible, 
particularly if the hard avalanche theorist is committed to the view that 
nothing really distinguishes Frosty from the rest of the avalanche—that 
is, if Frosty lacks a real self or self/other (Frosty/avalanche) boundary. 
The Buddhist hard determinist eliminativist about the self cannot have it 
both ways. 
 Goodman thinks it makes no sense to say, as I say above, that in a 
hard determinist picture, deterrence cannot work. For a social science 
study that showed that harsher laws sometimes reduced the frequency 
of crimes obviously would not refute determinism. Fear of punishment 
can be a causally efficacious factor that reduces the frequency of deci-
sions to commit crimes. And both theses 2 and 3, Goodman emphasizes, 
are normative claims; thus, they cannot conflict with the factual asser-
tion that the fear of punishment reduces the frequency of decisions to 
commit crimes. So, Goodman reasons, no part of the position expressed 
in theses 1-3 conflicts with the efficacy of deterrence. 
However, my claim that “deterrence will not work” did not mean 
deterrence is incompatible with hard determinism per se, but with 
Goodman’s more comprehensive Buddhist hard determinist eliminativ-
ism about the self. In his immediately preceding line of reasoning, 
Goodman had said, you will recall, that the innocent are in no need of 
reform, that “deterrence cannot work if people believe they are in dan-
ger of punishment whether or not they break the law,” and that we can 
rule out the possibility of punishing the innocent without having to ac-
cept that the guilty deserve punishment. What I am arguing is that if 
hard determinist eliminativism about the self is true, then nobody is tru-
ly guilty or responsible for anything they do, like Frosty, because all rel-
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evant causal explanation is agent exogenous or agent indifferent. In that 
case, everyone is innocent, nobody is in need of reform, and there is no-
body for whom deterrence can work. Deterrence also cannot work be-
cause, as Goodman notes, “Deterrence cannot work if people believe 
they are in danger of punishment whether or not they break the law”; if 
nobody is “guilty” of breaking the law, but deterrence is implemented at 
all, then people will “believe they are in danger of punishment whether 
or not they break the law.”  
There is an intuitive sense of desert in the idea that there is such 
a thing as “the innocent” (who, Goodman claims, are “in no need of re-
form,” as opposed to “the guilty,” who presumably are), and this notion 
makes sense, but is a bit more difficult for hard determinists to accom-
modate than it is for soft determinists. So, if there is no real distinction 
between self and other or guilt and innocence, then deterrence does 
punish people whether or not they are responsible for actions that from 
a legal standpoint break the law. In this context, deterrence cannot be 
morally justified and so “cannot work” in the way Goodman needs it to, 
even if it can be pragmatically justified on Skinnerian, consequentialist 
grounds. For if everyone is equally innocent and punishment morally 
arbitrary, there are no moral grounds for determining who deserves 
punishment. In this case, as Goodman notes, “Deterrence cannot work if 
people believe they are in danger of punishment whether or not they 
break the law.”  
Again, according to his theory, it is not really George or Frosty 
who “breaks” the law, but prenatal causal streams flowing through the 
conduits we have labeled “George” or “Frosty.” A snowball’s rolls, caused 
by an event prior to its rolling, such as an avalanche, might push a skier, 
causing her death. But here the word “push” involves an ambiguity, with 
both an intentional and an unintentional meaning, only the former of 
which counts for actions, as opposed to mere events. On what may be 
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described as “snowball eliminativist hard avalanche theory,” there are 
no real snowballs and thus there are no snowball proximal actions—
there is only avalanche level event causation. Thus, it is an equivocation 
to claim that some analogues of the snowball can be guilty of breaking 
the law and others innocent; this would imply that the latter are not in 
need of reform, and the former are guilty of their actions and thus in 
need of reform. 
Goodman agrees with some elements of my analysis, but insists 
that, given the context of his argument (his extended argument for Bud-
dhist consequentialism), what he said should be understood in a conse-
quentialist way. He admits that what I can legitimately press against his 
argument is that those who are punished are still “innocent” in the sense 
that they do not deserve to be punished, or that they have done nothing 
for which they can be held morally responsible. So even if the system he 
advocates would punish only those who have “done wrong,” it still 
seems morally objectionable. But he denies that there is any internal in-
consistency in his view, either normative or descriptive, and holds that 
mine is an external critique.  
I maintain, however, that his claim that the system he advocates 
would punish only those who have done wrong reveals an internal in-
consistency. He cannot consistently claim that anyone has “done wrong” 
because, in his view, it is not George who has “done” anything. If our best 
account of the action we attribute to George is that he has actually per-
formed (done) the action, rather than simply served as a conduit 
through which distal causal forces have manifested, however, then it 
seems that all the soft determinist’s intuitions of normativity are in the 
immediate offing. It is my contention that this same bump is in the rug 
in many forms of incompatibilism—not only hard determinism, but also 
semicompatibilism—and that when confronted by these objections these 
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theorists simply get around the problem by pushing the bump one way 
rather than another.39 
 Speaking to my repeated claim that the ability to explain agent 
proximal abilities is better handled by soft rather than hard determin-
ism, but inadvertently supporting what I have claimed is the hard de-
terminist’s strategy of late (to acknowledge but deem irrelevant all the 
agent proximal features of action on which soft determinists dote), 
Goodman claims that Śāntideva clearly thinks anger is evitable; certain 
kinds of meditation reduce or eliminate anger. This is a claim, Goodman 
emphasizes, about the causal efficacy of meditation, and it is compatible 
with hard determinism, as Goodman understands it, as with other claims 
about the causal efficacy of certain kinds of practices to change human 
behavior. Goodman suggests that I seem to see the issue more as he does 
when I say that all determinists agree that many of us often possess 
agent proximal abilities (in “Paleo-compatibilism” [79-81], I list these 
abilities as twenty items, numbered 1-20), but that hard determinists 
likely accept a “generic hard determinist principle”:  
No matter what agent proximal causal conditions are sat-
isfied, agents never exhibit free will in the responsibility-
entailing sense (Repetti “Paleo-compatibilism” 80). 
Goodman wonders, if what I say here is correct, how I could possibly re-
fute hard determinism by showing that agents sometimes satisfy certain 
agent proximal causal conditions. But I do not say that hard determinists 
are correct, nor do I intend to refute hard determinism just by showing 
that agents sometimes satisfy agent proximal conditions (although the 
considerations about Frosty come close). Rather, my reference to agent 
proximal items is merely to press the fact that Goodman seems to equate 
                                                             
39 In my monograph on free will (Counterfactual), I try to comprehensively expose the 
bump in the rug and trace it through all its evasive maneuvers. 
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all determinism with hard determinism, but that determinism, per se, 
may be construed as hard or soft, and there are some plausible grounds 
for construing it as soft.  
 Soft determinists disagree over which agent proximal conditions 
constitute responsible agency, but, contrary to hard determinists, as I 
have claimed, they likely accept a “generic soft determinist principle”: 
If certain agent proximal conditions are satisfied, agents 
exhibit free will in the responsibility-entailing sense (80). 
Thus, determinism clearly admits to both readings, so the question here 
is: Which of the two readings is more plausible for the Buddhist? And 
inasmuch as there is a sense in which some agent proximal conditions 
pose a greater problem for Buddhist hard determinist eliminativists 
about the self, as the Frosty case reveals, it seems clear that from a non-
eliminativist Buddhist perspective, soft determinism seems more plausi-
ble. 
Recall that the difference between hard and soft determinism, as 
Goodman understands these ideas, is not a metaphysical difference. For 
Goodman, it is a normative difference about what follows logically about 
desert and about the rational or moral appropriateness of attitudes from 
the standpoint of certain metaphysical premises. So the fact that Śān-
tideva accepts an agent proximal condition (which I identify as item 14, 
“Paleo-compatibilism”)40 cannot, in Goodman’s view, undermine the 
claim that he is a hard determinist in the sense Goodman suggests.  
                                                             
40 That condition is: The agent is aware of agent proximal causal factors and general 
karmic and/or causal conditions/processes that shape her choice parameters, she can 
reflect on which choice is Dharma-responsive, and she can make and effectively act on 
that choice, even in the face of phenomenologically powerful dispositional tendencies 
in the opposite direction (Repetti “Paleo-compatibilism” 81). 
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I disagree. Goodman acknowledges that normative claims may be 
morally justified on certain metaphysical grounds but not on others. But 
one such metaphysical ground on which the normative ascription, say, 
of guilt is appropriately applied may be the case in which George is suffi-
ciently causally responsible for bringing about the action. But on certain 
other metaphysical grounds the same normative claim may not be mor-
ally justified, such as it not being the case that it is (Frosty resembling) 
George who is sufficiently causally responsible for bringing about the ac-
tion. Given that the former is entailed by soft determinist noneliminativ-
ism about the self but the latter by hard determinist eliminativism about 
the self, it follows that free will, in the responsibility-entailing or re-
sponsible agency sense, is both a metaphysical and a normative matter, 
and one whose determining explanatory factor is causal, metaphysical. 
Thus, it is inaccurate to assume that the soft versus hard determinist de-
bate over the responsible agency question is primarily a normative mat-
ter; that assumption begs the question in favor of the hard determinist 
eliminativism about the self and about moral responsibility that is at is-
sue in free will inquiry. 
 If I agree that Buddhists such as Śāntideva reject the legitimacy of 
anger and resentment, then according to Goodman I am accepting that 
they hold that an accurate understanding of the way things are will be 
incompatible with a very significant part of our ordinary system of reac-
tive attitudes. To that extent, we agree, but the reason we agree is not 
the same: he sees anger and resentment as illegitimate because he sees 
all reactive attitudes as predicated on the illusion of agency, but I see 
them as such because they are soteriologically unskillful, and I do not see 
all reactive attitudes as predicated on the illusion of agency. Recall that, 
in my view, compassion, sympathetic joy, and the like are at least en-
lightenment-approximating Dharma-responsive attitudes, and at best the 
most appropriate Dharma-responsive attitudes of the enlightened, those 
who lack any illusions about the existence of the self.  
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 The interesting issue for Goodman—one he admits he may be 
wrong about—is about certain positive reactive attitudes such as grati-
tude, what I called “wholesome remorse” (in connection with the Bud-
dha’s feeling remorse but not being “tormented” by it), and perhaps for-
giveness. I would add that my reasoning about all the virtuous Dharma-
responsive attitudes fall into this problematic category. Goodman admits 
that it is far harder for Buddhists to show that the appropriateness of 
these attitudes is compatible with understanding the way things are. 
Goodman thinks I have not yet shown this or he the contrary, but I think 
I have given some reason to show it is true. If such attitudes are appro-
priate, Goodman acknowledges, Buddhists might have to adopt an 
asymmetric position like Wolf’s, though he thinks this position may also 
be vulnerable to the sort of objections I raised regarding whether it 
makes sense to think George has “done” wrong. Despite certain excep-
tions, the Kantian intuition persists: “Ought” implies “can.” 
 Although Goodman attributes hard determinism to Buddhists, 
the view he actually holds is hard incompatibilism. This is the view that 
there can be no responsible agency regardless of whether determinism 
or indeterminism is true. Goodman acknowledges that he does not know 
whether determinism is true, but he asserts that so long as there is no 
self, both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with basic 
desert and the appropriateness of the reactive attitudes. 
 I have argued the opposite of hard incompatibilism elsewhere, 
what may be called “soft compatibilism,” the claim that there can be re-
sponsible agency regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism is 
true (Repetti “Meditation”). In short, I argue that Buddhists ought to be 
soft compatibilists because advanced meditators can so successfully de-
tach themselves from the push and pull of phenomenologically powerful 
mental states or their contents, whether they are deterministically or 
indeterministically generated, that they cannot only sufficiently self-
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regulate (auto-nomos) for purposes of Dharma-responsive responsible 
agency, but also attain the highest states of mental freedom from all vo-
litional dispositions (cetanā)—liberated states Buddhists cannot deny be-
cause the whole of Buddhism revolves around them. 
 Here, however, Goodman would press his claim that there is no 
self in the advanced meditator’s process who can be the autonomous 
agent of any of what the meditator does (or should he say, of what hap-
pens to the meditator?), presumably including enlightenment. Goodman 
claims a proper interpretation of his position ought to acknowledge that 
etymologically, “autonomy” comes from “auto” and “nomos,” indicating 
“self-law.” Thus, the general argument would be: 
A1. Only a self could be autonomous. 
A2. There is no self; therefore,  
A3. There is no autonomy. (Goodman personal communi-
cation, February 2012) 
The more specifically Buddhist argument would be: 
B1. Only a self could be autonomous. 
B2. According to Buddhism, there is no self; therefore,  
B3. According to Buddhism, there is no autonomy. (Good-
man personal communication, February 2012) 
Goodman admits that he has not shown that Buddhists accept B1. But he 
continues to read Śāntideva (6:29-6:31) as expressing the kind of view he 
is arguing for, with the additional twist that the whole idea of a soul is 
incoherent; it would not be able to act even if it did exist. But the self and 
the soul are two different things; according to Buddhism, both George 
and Frosty lack a soul, but George clearly has the sort of agent proximal 
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abilities we associate with a conventional self—however ultimately con-
strued—that Frosty clearly lacks. 
 Goodman admits the “self” needed to make B1 true may differ 
from the “self” needed to make B2 true. He is referring to my earlier 
claim that the Buddha’s rejection of self was not unqualified, but aimed 
specifically at the inflated Indian concept, ātman, and that the Buddha 
accepted the deflated, changing, dependent mind. Goodman disagrees, 
however, and notes that there are passages in the Majjhima Nikāya and 
elsewhere in which the Buddha did not only deny that there was an āt-
man, but advocated the accuracy and usefulness of disidentifying from 
physical and mental aggregates and processes, of not regarding them as 
self. Part of this disidentification, Goodman thinks, implicitly rejects the 
concept of free will as it appears in Western philosophy, even in its com-
patibilist version. 
 This is a subtle matter of interpretation. Just to indicate how the 
context may contribute different shades of meaning to the Buddha’s re-
marks on this subject, let me quote one. A disciple asks the Buddha how 
the identity view does not come to be—which question reveals the con-
text—and the Buddha replies:  
Here, bhikkhu, a well-taught noble disciple . . . does not 
regard material form as self, or self as possessed of mate-
rial form, or material form as in self, or self as in material 
form. He does not regard feeling as self . . . perception as 
self . . . formations as self . . . consciousness as self, or self 
as possessed of consciousness, or consciousness as in self, 
or self as in consciousness. That is how identity view does 
not come to be. (MN 109:11)41 
                                                             
41 “MN” abbreviates the Majjhima Nikāya, available free online at 
http://www.palicanon.org/en/sutta-pitaka/transcribed-suttas/majjhima-nikaya/72-
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The point is that the Buddha is advising a disciple how it is that faulty 
conceptions of identity do not arise, presumably to help the disciple re-
habilitate any fault conception the disciple may maintain, so that the 
disciple may avoid feeding the conditions that fuel the arising of the 
faulty self-conception. This does imply that a conception of self that does 
identify self with any of the aggregates is faulty and/or implicated in suf-
fering. But all of this is consistent with the claim that I make and that 
Goodman denies, which is that the Buddha did not reject the processual-
self system, its efficacious role in agency, or its grounding of attributions 
of desert and moral responsibility. Arguably, all the Buddha rejected 
here was faulty identification with it as one’s self. 
 Referring to my meditation practice, Goodman asks: When I’m 
sitting and thoughts or feelings arise, despite my efforts to return my 
attention to the breath, do these thoughts and feelings exhibit autono-
my? And what, he asks, about my efforts to return attention to the 
breath? I will see them as autonomous, on his account, only if I identify 
with them, but this identification is a mistake. Identification with any 
items is, from a Buddhist perspective, undoubtedly a mistake. However, 
one need not identify with one’s efforts (or any other items associated 
with autonomy) for it to be true or false that one satisfies autonomy 
conditions, on my view. For one may acknowledge that one’s views, in-
tentions, speech, actions, efforts, one-pointedness, and mindfulness are 
ultimately impersonal in origin, on the one hand, but that together they 
constitute a tightly clustered causal system that exhibits system reflex-
ive features (system monitoring, system approving or disapproving, sys-
tem revising, and so forth) that ground conventional or pragmatic at-
tributions of responsible agency to the system, on the other hand, with-
out erroneously identifying with them.  
                                                                                                                                                       
mn-109-mahpuama-sutta-the-greater-discourse-on-the-full-moon-night.html (ac-
cessed March 22, 2012). 
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 As I have argued (“Meditation”), the metaphorical raft that the 
Buddhist constructs to cross the sea of existence to “the other shore” of 
enlightenment is such a Dharma-responsive reflexive (self-monitoring, 
self-controlling, self-revising) system. That system is built out of items 
especially in the latter part of my more general list of twenty items of 
autonomy criteria (items 14-20), that may be extracted from the Eight-
fold Path. 
 
Conclusion 
In closing, I shall first summarize Goodman’s main argument for Bud-
dhist hard determinism, and then my own assessment thereof. The ar-
gument had two main components, a no-self component and a no-
responsibility component, each of which had an original version and a 
more refined version.42 
 Goodman’s original no-self argument alleges that because there is 
no self, there is no autonomy. The original version of this no-self argu-
ment was shown to be logically flawed, like the no-red-apples argument, 
and the later “auto-nomos” version, although sensitive to the more nu-
anced Buddhist distinctions between inflated and deflated conceptions 
of the self, seems to erroneously equate system level satisfaction of sys-
tem-reflexive (autonomy) criteria with faulty identification with the sys-
tem as the self—that is, systems may be self-regulating (auto-nomos) 
without erroneous conceptions of self-identity. (Compare: some heating 
systems may be self-regulating if they possess the right sort of thermo-
stat, without any faulty sense of identity.)  
                                                             
42 The original versions are from Goodman’s Consequences; the more refined versions are 
from personal communications (February 2012). 
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 Goodman’s original no-responsibility argument alleges that re-
sponsibility and free will are interdependent, but because Buddhists re-
ject responsibility, they also reject free will. This argument is invalid (as 
revealed in the analogous inference that Jimmy thinks Clark can fly), and 
its premises are implausible (because it is not obvious that Buddhism re-
jects moral responsibility). His later version, as illustrated in his claims 
about George, avoids these difficulties, but encounters others: namely, 
the asymmetry objection and the inconsistency charge regarding the 
idea that George has “done” wrong. Therefore, despite the impressive 
arguments Goodman offers for Buddhist consequentialism, his argu-
ments for Buddhist hard determinism—although mostly consistent with 
his larger consequentialist project—are not entirely convincing in their 
current formulation. 
 Let us now place this summary of Goodman’s argument in the 
larger context of a summary of Buddhist scholarship on the issue of free 
will. Although early-period scholars sought a middle path between “rig-
id” hard determinist and “chaotic” indeterminist libertarian extremes, 
but failed to clearly articulate their positions, middle-period scholars 
Siderits and Goodman shift in the direction of partial incompatibilism or 
semicompatibilism, in Siderits’s case, or full incompatibilism, in Good-
man’s. 
 Siderits’s paleo-compatibilism seeks to salvage elements of both 
extremes by locating them on different levels of discourse, one of which, 
the conventional (in which persons exist and have free will), reduces to 
the other, the ultimate (in which there are no persons but only person-
series that are entirely determined by impersonal causes), but his par-
ticular reductionism is mostly limited to pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism and 
unlikely to impress Mahāyānists, compatibilists, or incompatibilists 
without further refinements. However, if those refinements develop 
(perhaps along traditional semicompatibilist lines as well as along the 
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lines of the progression Siderits traces from reductionism through anti-
realism to semantic nondualism), his general strategy seems promising. 
Goodman embraces incompatibilism in the form of hard determinism, 
arguing that Buddhism rejects autonomous agency because it rejects 
agency or selfhood as well as moral responsibility, the latter of which 
presupposes an autonomous self. But his arguments are not entirely per-
suasive, despite the richness of his Buddhist consequentialist theory. Si-
derits and Goodman may be said to embrace hard determinism in differ-
ent ways, reflecting different reactions to the anātman (no-self) doctrine.  
Looking forward, in recent-period scholarship (Repetti “Recent”), 
these divisions run more acutely along doctrinal lines, where scholars 
relying mostly on Pāli (pre-Mahāyāna) sources mostly accept determin-
ism, but scholars relying mostly on Sanskrit (Mahāyāna) sources seem to 
embrace indeterminism. Both such groups agree, however, that Bud-
dhism is compatible with free will even in the absence of a real self.  
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